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WAGE COMPRESSION
AS A DEMOCRATIC IDEAL
Stephen Plass*
Wage disparity between workers in the same occupations and be-
tween senior managers and the rest of the workforce has become a defin-
ing issue for policymakers.  The economic claims of capital and those of
labor remain at odds.  Business supporters argue that greater pay for the
larger workplace will result in loss of employment, higher prices for
products and services, and loss of competitive advantage in the global
marketplace.  Labor advocates respond that higher wages promote
greater productivity, increase demand for goods and services, and facili-
tate the strengthening of democratic institutions.  Neither side is per-
suaded by the other, and this has created an impasse with respect to
federal intervention to moderate the effects of dramatic pay growth for
senior managers and stagnant or declining wages for the larger
workforce.
This Article discusses the ideas and practices that have produced
large wage disparities and the regulatory environment that has accom-
modated it.  On the labor regulation side, the Article evaluates the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act’s (NLRA) approach to wage contracting,
including its accommodation of right-to-work laws.  It shows that the
free-market wage policy of the NLRA is generally embraced by unions,
although its effects may be more devastating than the NLRA’s tolerance
for right-to-work laws that unions condemn.  On the corporate govern-
ance side, it shows that shareholders’ interests rather than overall stag-
nant wages have driven regulatory attempts to curb excessive executive
pay, and say-on-pay and new CEO pay disclosure regulations are not
designed to address wage disparity.  The Article argues that wage com-
pression can be achieved through unrepresented worker protest and col-
lective bargaining practices that link the plight of workers to the overall
compensation practices of their employers.  It proposes a revitalization
of bonus and profit-sharing practices that reduce employers’ long-term
risks as a more viable collective bargaining strategy to reduce wage di-
vergence while reducing the financial risks associated with fixed in-
creases of wages and benefits.
* Professor, St. Thomas University School of Law.
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INTRODUCTION
Wage policy has been the most dominant and difficult labor issue
facing policymakers in recent years.1  Senior managers have been in-
dicted for receiving unearned lavish compensation packages2 while
1 Disagreement in Congress over raising the minimum wage has been ongoing for sev-
eral years.  Republicans have argued that an increase in the minimum wage will result in job
losses, so this matter should be left to the states based on their own economic realities. See
Chris Opfer, Democrats Unveil $12 Minimum Wage Bill, Despite Little Chance Congress Will
Enact It, 83 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-1 (Apr. 30, 2015).  While there is evidence that increas-
ing the minimum wage will cause some job loss, there is disagreement about whether that loss
would be substantial. See id.  Attempts to strengthen the bargaining rights of workers under
the National Labor Relations Act have also stalled because of political disagreement. See
Richard L. Trumka & Craig Becker, The Future of Work: Labor Law Must Catch Up, PAC.
STANDARD (Aug. 14, 2015), http://www.psmag.com/business-economics/the-future-of-work-
labor-law-must-catch-up (noting that labor law reform that would have guaranteed a first con-
tract to workers who choose a union was blocked in the Senate by filibuster).
2 See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 330–35 (2014) (ob-
serving that the large salaries paid to senior managers cannot be justified on productivity
grounds); LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFUL-
FILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (reporting that sometimes top execu-
tives reap large rewards even when they perform terribly); Lawrence Josh Bivens & Lawrence
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hourly workers have been protesting for a living minimum wage of $15
per hour.3  Republicans and Democrats have drawn clear battle lines on
this issue.  Republicans oppose a graduated federal minimum wage hike
from $7.25 to $10.10 per hour4 and have promoted right-to-work laws
that deprive unions of financial support essential to their viability.5  Ef-
forts by Democrats to strengthen the legal rights and bargaining power of
employees or their unions through the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) have been blocked since 1977,6 and the issue of excessive exec-
Mishel, The Pay of Corporate Executives and Financial Professionals as Evidence of Rent in
the Top 1 Percent Incomes, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 57 (2013) (noting that executive contracts are
structured to mask the fact that compensation is not tied to performance).  Outlandish retire-
ment pay has also been targeted for regulation during the 2008 recession. See Press Release,
White House, Remarks by President Barack Obama on Executive Compensation with Secre-
tary Geithner (Feb. 4, 2009) (reporting the President’s statement, “[W]e’re putting a stop to
these kinds of massive severance packages we’ve all read about with disgust; we’re taking the
air out of the golden parachute.”).
3 See Rhonda Smith, Our Walmart Organizers, Allies Unveil Plans For Company
Shareholders’ Meeting June 5, 103 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-4 (May 29, 2015); Sharehold-
ers’ Meeting to Come With Side of Protest, 29 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 921 (May 6, 2015); Bruce
Horovitz & Yamiche Alcindor, Fast-Food Strikes Widen into Social-Justice Movement, USA
TODAY (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2015/04/15/fast-food-strike-
fight-for-15-service-employees-international-union/25787045/.
4 For example, in 2013, Democrats proposed raising the minimum wage to $10.10 per
hour over two years. See Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2013, H.R. 1010, 113th Cong. (2013).
Republicans defeated this measure, and in 2015, Democrats returned with a proposal to pro-
vide graduated increases over four years to $12 per hour. See Raise the Wage Act, H.R. 2150,
114th Cong. (2015).  Given the Republican response to a $10.10 increase, one Republican
Senator suggested that the new proposal will guarantee no movement on this issue. See Chris
Opfer, Collins Working on $9 Minimum Wage Hike, As Counter to Democrats’ $12 Per Hour
Plan, 78 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-14 (Apr. 23, 2015).  Even a Republican senator’s attempt
to propose an increase to $9 per hour was blocked in 2014. See id.
5 Inspired by Republican successes in enacting state right-to-work laws, Republicans in
the federal legislature have introduced and reintroduced a proposal for a national law that
would prohibit unions from requiring that represented employees pay union dues or fees. See
National Right-to-Work Act, S. 391, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 612, 114th Cong. (2015).
Republicans argue that union security clauses force represented workers to give unions finan-
cial support, and deny these employees the right to disassociate with unions and deal individu-
ally with employers about workplace issues. See Chris Opfer, Republicans Reintroduce Right-
to-Work Bill, but House Leadership Support Still Unclear, 29 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 221 (Feb.
4, 2015).
6 See RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG & MOSHE Z. MARVIT, WHY LABOR ORGANIZING
SHOULD BE A CIVIL RIGHT: REBUILDING A MIDDLE CLASS DEMOCRACY BY ENHANCING WORK-
ERS’ VOICES 5 (2012) (“Each time that Democrats have controlled the presidency and both
houses in Congress they have sought to alter labor law, and each time they have failed.”).
Republicans have also vigorously opposed any interpretation of the NLRA that they view as
pro-union.  For example, when the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) recently invited
briefs on the question of whether a union should be permitted to charge nonpaying employees
a fee if they desire grievance representation, Republicans responded that this was a pro-union
move to circumvent states’ right-to-work laws. See Lawrence Dube´, House Republicans Wary
of NLRB Case, Citing Threat to State Right-to-Work Laws, 73 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-1
(June 3, 2015).  Longstanding NLRB law holds that unions must provide grievance representa-
tion to organized workers who are excused from giving them financial support by state right-
to-work laws. See Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, Local 697, 223 N.L.R.B. 832 (1976).  Even
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utive compensation unrelated to performance has not been tied to the
wage claims of the larger workforce.7  Meanwhile, wage growth for se-
nior managers continue to outpace that of other workers thereby pushing
wage divergence to a historical high mark.8  Labor regulations and un-
ions have been credited with helping to stabilize the economy and help-
ing to garner strong middle-class wages.9  And the decline of unions has
been associated with up to a fifth of the growth in wage inequality.10  As
procedural NLRB reforms that are viewed as disadvantaging employers are subjected to multi-
layered challenges. See Associated Builders & Contractors of Tex., Inc. v. NLRB, No. 1-15-
CV-026 RP, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78890 (W.D. Tex. June 1, 2015) (holding that the NLRB
was not arbitrary and capricious, nor did it violate the rights of employers and employees
under the NLRA, when it issued new representation proceedings rules); see also Chamber of
Commerce v. NLRB, 118 F. Supp. 3d 171 (D.D.C. 2015) (rejecting a similar challenge).
Republicans also launched a Congressional Review Act challenge to block the Board’s new
representation rules, but this initiative was vetoed by the president. See Presidential Memoran-
dum, White House, Memorandum of Disapproval Regarding S.J. Res. 8  (Mar. 31, 2015).
Republicans have even devised a plan of “board-packing” by proposing the addition of a sixth
member (3 Democrats and 3 Republicans), while still requiring majority rule. See Chris
Opfer, McConnell, Alexander Take Another Shot at Revamping NLRB, Adding Sixth Member,
18 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-13 (Jan. 28, 2015).
7 Regulatory attempts to rein in excessive executive rewards through disclosure and tax
laws have been grounded in promoting shareholder value and increasing tax revenue. See
Steven Balsam, Taxes and Executive Compensation, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Aug. 14, 2012) (re-
porting that tax laws intended to reduce excessive compensation unrelated to performance
have only produced losses for shareholders and the U.S. Treasury, while allowing non-per-
formance and non-deductible compensation to grow).  There is slight optimism that a new
SEC rule requiring disclosure of the ratio of annual CEO compensation to median compensa-
tion of all other employees will stir low-wage workers into action. See Gretchen Morgenson,
Why Putting a Number to C.E.O. Pay Might Bring Change, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/08/09/business/why-putting-a-number-to-ceo-pay-might-bring-
change.html.
8 See PIKETTY, supra note 2, at 292–93, 321 (reporting that wage disparity is at Great R
Depression levels and rival European disparities of 100 years ago).
9 See KAHLENBERG & MARVIT, supra note 6, at 16; Steven A. Ramirez, The Law and R
Macroeconomics of the New Deal at 70, 62 MD. L. REV. 515, 549 (2003) (acknowledging that,
as a way of stimulating economic growth, the NLRA was intended to build a vibrant middle
class with higher wages); Waterloo Educ. Ass’n v. Iowa Pub. Emp’t Relations Bd., 740
N.W.2d 418, 420 (Iowa 2007) (noting that after the NLRA was enacted, a large number of
unionized private workers entered the middle class); see also Wilma B. Liebman, The Revival
of American Labor Law, 34 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 291, 295 (2010) (explaining that, during
the “golden age of collective bargaining” following the enactment of the NLRA, millions of
unionized workers began to form part of the middle class due to the fair wages and benefits
obtained through collective bargaining agreements).
10 See Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage
Inequality, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 513 (2011) (reporting that the impact of union decline on wages
is similar to the impact of education). Others have suggested that wage inequality is driven by
skill levels, not education or experience. See Chinhui Juhn et al., Wage Inequality and the Rise
in Returns to Skill, 101 J. POL. ECON. 410 (1993).  And recent reports indicate that skill level is
a major driver of job growth today. See Victoria Stilwell & Craig Torres, All but Richest
Households Saw Drop in Incomes in 2010–2013, Fed Reports, 172 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-
5 (Sept. 9, 2014) (“‘What we have seen in recent years is the polarization of the labor market’
as job growth is skewed toward the highest and lowest skill levels, hollowing out the mid-
dle . . . .”); see also Tyrone Richardson, Mayors Report: Post-Recession Economy Created
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a result, it is argued that policymakers should be alarmed at the precipi-
tous decline of union membership and power which serve as a counter-
vailing force to the excesses of capital.11
This message is being delivered by the President and Vice President
of the United States, union leaders, academics, and many others who
support the goal of unions to increase the economic security of work-
ers.12  But these claims have not produced tangible results. Union density
has declined,13 and legislative initiatives have failed.14  Meanwhile, the
number of workers earning wages above the national median of $17.40
per hour continues to shrink along with, it is contended, the quality of
our democracy.15
Wage Inequality, Jobs Paying Less, 28 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 1894 (Sept. 3, 2014) (recom-
mending “high quality education” as a mitigating force for wage inequality).
11 See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 3–4 (1984)
(concluding that unions serve as a check on arbitrary managerial decisionmaking and give
workers a voice both at work and in politics); see also KAHLENBERG & MARVIT, supra note 6,
at 15 (contending that the fall of unions has led to grave income inequality and a shrinking
middle class); JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUN-
TERVAILING POWER 146 (1956) (observing that when the economic focus is on competition,
social costs and effects are ignored); Michelle Amber & Susan R. Hobbs, Is Collective Bar-
gaining Headed for Crisis in 2016?, 18 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) S-54 (Jan. 28, 2014) (observ-
ing that employers are demanding more concessions and are increasingly locking out their
workers to enforce their demands).
12 See Chris Opfer, Obama Touts Middle Class Economic Plan Centered Around Income
Growth Proposals, 29 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 158 (Jan. 28, 2015) (reporting the President’s call
for laws that will strengthen unions and collective bargaining); Ben Penn, Trumka Says Labor
Still in Crisis, Call For Bolder Action by Obama and Congress, 28 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 1883
(Sept. 3, 2014) (noting the AFL-CIO president’s lament about suppressed wages and the fail-
ure of political leaders to address it).
13 See Chris Opfer, Union Representation Down Last Year, Led by Drop in Membership
Among Women, 27 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 187 (Jan. 30, 2013) (reporting continuing declines in
both the private and public sectors, bringing the total union represented workforce to 15.9
million); News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members —2013 (Jan. 24, 2014),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_01242014.pdf (noting union membership is
down to a low 11.3%).  This contrasts sharply with the 35% of workers represented during
unions’ heyday. See Jon Talton, Heyday For Unions in the Rearview Mirror, SEATTLE TIMES
(Sept. 3, 2011), http://www.seattletimes.com/business/economy/heyday-for-unions-in-the-
rearview-mirror/.
14 See supra note 6. R
15 Vice President Joseph Biden has added his voice to this claim, stating that the decline
in wages corresponds with the decline of unions, and this destabilizes the middle class and the
economy. See Susan R. Hobbs, Biden Credits Organized Labor for Keeping Barbarians at the
Gate, 24 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-3 (Feb. 5, 2014).  Biden added that it also undermines the
country’s social and political stability. Id.  Union negotiating success has also been credited
with helping to compress wages and reduce wage inequality and its associated evils. See TOKE
AIDT & ZAFIRIS TZANNATOS, UNIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: ECONOMIC EFFECTS IN A
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 54 (2002) (concluding that unions reduce wage dispersion between
similar firms, among workers, and between workers with different skills); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ,
THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE 21–22
(2013) (arguing that the wide disparities in income in America have moved it closer to becom-
ing a dysfunctional society where only the wealthy have access to desirable goods).
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While most workers like to think of themselves as middle class, by
economic measures, a large portion of the workforce does not earn mid-
dle-class wages.16  Based on an annual income of $23,050 for a family of
four, the Census Bureau reported that 46.2 million Americans are living
in poverty.17  Over 22 million workers earn between $6 and $10 per
hour, which is well below the national median of $17.40 per hour.18  This
pay deficit is exacerbated by the fact that real wages have fallen even for
those earning $8.78 to $10.60 per hour.19  By contrast, chief executive
officers’ median compensation in 2012 was $2.5 million, $4.7 million,
and $9.7 million, for small, mid-sized, and large companies,
respectively.20
Given the high cost of housing, food, goods, and services, large
swaths of the workforce do not earn enough to meet their basic needs,
nor do they have capital assets that provide alternative income.21  It is
estimated that in the most affordable areas in the country, a two-parent,
two-child family needs an annual income over $49,000 to live ade-
quately.22  This is more than double government estimates for the same
size family.  And the $49,000 figure does not include reserves for items
16 Forty percent of Americans with annual incomes below $20,000 say they are middle
class. See Dan Horn, Middle Class a Matter of Income, Attitude, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (Apr.
14, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/04/14/middle-class-hard-de
fine/2080565/.  The national median household income is $50,054 and economists typically
use the middle 20% of that number to define the middle class, i.e., between $39,000 and
$63,000 per year. Id.
17 See David Francis, Where Do You Fall in the American Economic Class System, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 13, 2012), http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/arti
cles/2012/09/13/where-do-you-fall-in-the-american-economic-class-system.  And for the
working poor, wages are generally their only source of income.
18 See Table 1: National Employment and Wage Data From the Occupational Employ-
ment Statistics Survey by Occupation, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/
news.release/ocwage.t01.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
19 See Wages Fall More for Lower-Wage Workers than High Earners in 2009–2012,
Study Says, 131 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-9 (July 9, 2013).
20 See Mary Hughes, CEO at Smaller Companies Saw Pay Grow, Stock Awards Gain
Ground, Survey Finds, 144 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-5 (July 26, 2013).
21 See Percentage of U.S. Workers Living Paycheck to Paycheck Reaches Recession-Era
Lows, Finds Career Builders Survey, CAREERBUILDER (Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.career
builder.com/share/aboutus/pressreleasesdetail.aspx?sd=8%2F15%2F2012&id=pr711&ed
=12%2F31%2F2012 (reporting survey results that show 40% of workers always live paycheck
to paycheck).
22 See Elise Gould et al., What Families Need to Get By, ECON. POL’Y INST. 2 (Aug. 26,
2015), http://www.epi.org/publication/what-families-need-to-get-by-epis-2015-family-budget-
calculator/.
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such as savings, retirement income, or college accounts.23  By contrast, a
minimum-wage, full-time worker earns about $15,000 per year.24
While the wages of most workers have stagnated or fallen, the pay
of senior managers has skyrocketed.25  The result is a divergence in
wages of historic proportions.26  While firm managers seek to cap the
average worker’s pay based on the market value of their productive ca-
pacity or contribution, pay for top managers faces less stringent scrutiny
for the correlation between pay and performance.27  This Article explores
linking executive pay to the plight of low-wage workers as a reform
strategy.  Its normative statement is that existing wage disparities in the
same occupations and between occupations make wage compression a
socially desirable goal.28  By examining the foundational principles of
labor regulation, the Article seeks to show the limits of law reform ver-
sus the possibilities of direct action by workers targeting compensation
practices.
The Article starts by discussing the economic imperative of employ-
ers to reduce labor costs.  It looks at low-wage and cost-cutting employ-
ment practices that are prevalent even when profits are high.  Part I
identifies the regulations governing the contracting of labor and notes the
absence of legal constraints on the economic aspects of buying and sell-
ing labor.  As a result, employers can drive down labor costs to market
23 See id. at 1. This budget is calculated “by estimating community-specific costs of
housing, food, child care, transportation, health care, other necessities, and taxes.” Id.
24 See id. at 8.  And women dominate the low-wage category. See Ben Penn, Women
Hold Two-Thirds of Low-Wage Jobs Earning Up to $10.10 an Hour, Study Finds, 151 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-11 (Aug. 6, 2014).
25 See PIKETTY, supra note 2, at 264–65 (reporting that wage inequality in the United R
States is at an unprecedented level, and this is primarily attributable to the astronomical growth
of senior managers’ pay); Bivens & Mishel, supra note 2, at 57 (identifying excessive pay to R
executives as a primary cause of declining income growth for others).
26 See PIKETTY, supra note 2, at 321 (reporting that wage disparity is now at Great De- R
pression levels).
27 See Jay Lorsch & Rakesh Khurana, The Pay Problem, HARV. MAG., http://harvardma
gazine.com/2010/05/the-pay-problem# (last visited Apr. 8, 2016) (reporting that shareholders,
boards of directors and executives believe pay levels are appropriate, while institutional share-
holders, the public, and politicians believe pay is excessive); see also Marc van Essen et al.,
Assessing Managerial Power Theory: A Meta-Analytic Approach to Understanding the Deter-
minants of CEO Compensation, 41 J. MGMT. 164 (2015) (finding that executives with influ-
ence over their pay receive higher compensation than those whose boards exert more power
over the pay process).
28 See STIGLITZ, supra note 15, at 83 (observing that widely unequal societies are ineffi- R
cient, unstable and unsustainable); Catherine Ruetschlin, Fast Food Failure: How CEO-to-
Worker Pay Disparity Undermines the Industry and the Overall Economy, DEMOS (Apr. 22,
2014), http://www.demos.org/publication/fast-food-failure-how-ceo-worker-pay-disparity-
undermines-industry-and-overall-economy (“From Davos to Wall Street to Main Street, there
is a growing consensus that inequality slows economic recovery and dampens consumer de-
mand.”); see also PIKETTY, supra note 2, at 297 (concluding that wage inequality contributed R
to the 2008 financial crisis).
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levels, resulting in greater worker dependence on government support.29
This reality has led to protests by unorganized workers and demands for
more stringent labor laws by unions.
Part II looks at the legal rules of collective bargaining that control a
union’s ability to get wage increases from employers.  It shows that the
legal empowerment of unions was conditioned on their embrace of free-
market bargaining, and unions have remained faithful to this process de-
spite its limitations.30  On the issue of pay, labor laws made employer
bargaining liberties preeminent.  Part II evaluates the national decision to
classify employers’ contractual liberties as the most fundamental work-
place right under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),31  while at-
tempting to grant workers bargaining power vis-a`-vis their employers.  It
highlights an employer’s legal right to be efficient by isolating wage and
benefit costs for trimming, even if profits are high or competitive advan-
tage is secure.  It shows that, by leaving employers with the economic
option to use the market when union bargaining proposals were unattrac-
tive,32 the NLRA in effect reserved in employers a veto power over
union wage and benefits demands.  Now employers are increasingly ex-
29 State governments have been providing substantial support to low-wage workers par-
ticularly in the area of healthcare. See Mary E. Forsberg, Attention Shoppers: You Pay the
Health Insurance Bills for Some of New Jersey’s Largest Employers, N.J. POL’Y PERSP. 1
(Aug. 9, 2005), http://www.njpp.org/assets/reports/budget-fiscal/17-rpt_familycare.pdf.  One
report showed Nebraska paid about $100 million per year in Medicaid benefits to private
sector workers. See Paul Hammel, Thousands with Jobs are on Medicaid Rolls, OMAHA
WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 19, 2005, at 1B.  Most of this government support is going to employ-
ees of very large corporations that report substantial profits even during the latest recession.
See Dave Jamieson, Low Wage Workers Employed Mostly by Large, Highly Profitable Corpo-
rations: Report, HUFFINGTON POST (July 19, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/
19/low-wage-workers-_n_1687271.html.
30 According to a past president of America’s most iconic union, “[t]he American trade
union movement—unlike any other labor movement in the world—is committed to working
within the American political and economic system in order to achieve the social and eco-
nomic justice promised by the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.” See John P.
Moody, Attacks by Big Business Imperils Labor—Meany, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 4,
1978, at 1; see also Penn, supra note 12 (reporting that the president of the AFL-CIO is R
seeking a political or legislative fix to wage suppression while acknowledging that unions are
too weak to secure such changes).
31 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012).
32 See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938) (holding that
employers can operate with non-union workers in the event of a strike to secure bargaining
proposals).
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ercising their broad contractual freedom to reduce their wage bill,33 fur-
ther contributing to wage divergence.34
Part III looks at the forces that will incentivize employers to con-
tinue bidding down labor costs.  It shows how globalization has put free
market labor contracting on steroids by broadening alternative low-wage
labor markets and new product markets.  Employers are incentivized to
cut both the mandatory and voluntary costs associated with purchasing
labor35 and are shifting capital and production to locales that are hospita-
ble to profit imperatives.36  Historically presumptive voluntary bene-
fits—such as employer-provided health and retirement plans—are now
routinely reduced or eliminated.  Even benefits traditionally regarded as
automatic perks—such as holiday, sick, and vacation pay—are
threatened.  Using the proxy statements from a publicly traded company
as an example, Part III shows how stockholders’ and senior managers’
interests are pitted against workers when a labor contract is being negoti-
ated.  With senior management compensation tied to metrics that include
reduced labor costs, managers are incentivized to cut pay and benefits to
realize economic benefits for stockholders and themselves.  Further, se-
nior managers are allowed to take ever larger shares of profits for them-
selves without proof that their performance is responsible for
productivity gains, thereby leaving less to be distributed to the larger
workforce.
The final section of the Article looks at the small but important
gains made by unorganized workers condemning wage divergence.37  It
summarizes the economic and political barriers unions face under the
NLRA38 and argues that proposed regulatory reform of the NLRA is a
weak antidote for the statute’s free market bargaining policy which re-
33 See Bernard Condon & Paul Wiseman, Recession, Tech Kill Middle Class Jobs,
MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 25, 2013 (reporting that 70% of the jobs gained since the recession ended
in 2009 are low-wage); Larry Swisher, Recovery Tilts Toward Lower-Wage Jobs, Industries,
Findings by BNA, Others Show, 231 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D-1 (Nov. 30, 2012) (reporting a
54% job growth rate for low-paying jobs).
34 See Lawrence Mishel, Unions, Inequality, and Faltering Middle-Class Wages, ECON.
POL’Y INST., Aug. 29, 2012, at 1.
35 See infra notes 47–50 and accompanying text. R
36 See David Wessel, Big U.S. Firms Shift Hiring Abroad, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 19, 2011),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704821704576270783611823972.
37 See Smith, supra note 3 (reporting on workers’ proposal to address wage disparity at R
Walmart); Mary Wisniewski, McDonald’s Employees Are Swarming Headquarters to Protest
Low Wages During the Company’s Annual Meeting, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 20, 2015), http://
www.businessinsider.com/r-mcdonalds-other-fast-food-workers-protest-ahead-of-annual-
meeting-2015-5 (reporting planned protest by McDonald’s workers to publicize to sharehold-
ers their call for $15 per hour wages).  Unions also plan to publicize their wage disparity
concerns but primarily at the bargaining table. See Michael Rose, Unions Will Stand United to
Demand Workers’ Share of Profits, CWA Leader Says, 29 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 455 (Mar. 4,
2015).
38 See infra text accompanying notes 196–226. R
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mains unchallenged.39  However, protest targeting corporate pay prac-
tices has shown good potential for success.40  It shows that independent
and union-backed publicity campaigns by unorganized workers can lead
to wage gains and renewed support for unions that are capable of locking
in those gains through collective bargaining.  It also proposes a union
bargaining strategy of “positive repricing,” profit sharing that supple-
ments contractual wage rates based on profitability metrics.41
I. THE GROWTH OF LOW-WAGE LABOR
“You guys are the only guys keeping the barbarians at
the gate.”42
For many workers, selling their labor has become an enterprise in
economic warfare.43  Driven by product market competition, wage com-
petition, or the imperative for larger profits, employers are devising com-
pensation schemes and conspiring to reduce their labor costs.44
39 Despite recurring past failures, unions are still convinced that reforming the NLRA is
the key to improving workers’ wages. See Ben Penn, AFL-CIO Leaders Call for Labor Law
Overhaul, 29 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 1774 (Aug. 25, 2015) (reporting labor leaders’ claim that a
weak NLRA is partly responsible for “a steep plunge in union membership and a surge in
income inequality”).  And planned union reform proposals appear to focus on increased penal-
ties and broader rights under the NLRA, rather than a change in the structure of the parties’
bargaining liberties. See Chris Opfer, AFL-CIO Congressional Democrats to Unveil Legisla-
tion Package to Overhaul Labor Law, 91 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-3 (May 12, 2015) (report-
ing the AFL-CIO president’s disclosure that the union’s agenda is to strengthen the hand of
collective bargaining, including giving collective bargaining to people that don’t have a union
yet).
40 Major employers such as Walmart and McDonalds have proposed wage increases in
response to protests at shareholders’ meetings condemning wide wage disparities. See supra
note 3. R
41 The term “repricing” is executive compensation parlance for reducing the exercise
price of stock options when stock prices fall, thereby allowing top managers to evade the risk
associated with this element of compensation. See Mark A. Chen, Executive Option Repricing,
Incentives, and Retention, 59 J. FIN. 1167 (2004) (reporting on the practice of repricing and the
arguments for and against it).  Positive repricing would be a contractual commitment to pro-
vide workers a bonus based on successful company performance.
42 Joseph Biden, Vice President of the United States, Address to the United Auto Work-
ers Union Delegates (Feb. 5, 2014); see Hobbs, supra note 15. R
43 Food service workers, janitorial staff, temporary job agency workers and other low
wage occupations have been particularly affected. See Ben Penn, Federally Contracted Work-
ers Strike In D.C., Demanding Obama Guarantee Living Wages, 27 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA)
1000 (May 28, 2013) (reporting striking workers’ objection to being paid $8.25 per hour);
Gayle Cinquegrani, Louisiana Staffing Agency to Pay $1.9 Million After Misclassifying Wages
As Per Diem Pay, 87 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-8 (May 6, 2013) (reporting the improper
denial of overtime compensation to a broad group of industrial services workers by an employ-
ment agency).
44 See Joel Rosenblatt, Apple, Google Agree to Pay $415 Million in Settlement of Anti-
trust Hiring Charges, 29 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 107 (Jan. 21, 2015) (reporting the technology
companies’ decision to pay $415 million to settle claims that they conspired to keep wages
down, after a judge had rejected a $324.5 million settlement offer as too low); Joel Rosenblatt,
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Businesses, large and small, are using their strong bargaining position
and contractual liberties to avoid many of the costs traditionally associ-
ated with having full-time employees.45  And, except for minimum wage
and overtime compensation laws,  employers have few legal constraints
on the way they contract labor and compensate for it.46
A. The Art of Reducing Labor Costs
Cutting labor costs has become an art form in response to competi-
tive pressures, and increasingly, as a profit-maximizing tool.  For their
at-will employees, employers are unilaterally cutting pay, reducing
hours, and reducing or eliminating holiday, vacation, health, and retire-
ment benefits, among other things.47  Essentially, pay and other eco-
Oracle Sued Over Antitrust Claims on Hiring that Echo 2011 Apple-Google-Intel Lawsuit,
2000 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-11 (Oct. 16, 2014) (reporting workers’ claim that several
technology companies illegally conspired to not hire each other’s workers in order to keep
wages down); Joel Rosenblatt, Disney, Dreamworks, Others Sued Over Alleged No-Poaching
Agreement, 174 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-2 (Sept. 9, 2014) (reporting similar claim against
film industry employers); see also County Employment and Wages: Third Quarter 2012, Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics (Mar. 28, 2013), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/
cewqtr_03282013.pdf (reporting that nine of the ten largest United States counties saw de-
creases in average weekly earnings in 2012); Chris Isidore, Corporate Profits Hit Record As
Wages Get Squeezed, CNN MONEY (Dec. 4, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/12/03/news/
economy/record-corporate-profits/ (reporting that wages have fallen to their lowest level as a
share of GDP even as corporate profits soar).
45 By contracting labor outside of employer/employee agency rules, employers can sig-
nificantly reduce labor costs. See, e.g., FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (approving employer classifying package delivery drivers as independent contrac-
tors thereby avoiding the costs associated with unionism under the NLRA). But not all non-
employee classifications are successful. See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F.3d 1187 (9th
Cir. 1996) (holding that Microsoft improperly classified workers as temporary agency employ-
ees to avoid paying benefits offered to permanent workers); Herman v. Time Warner, Inc., 56
F. Supp. 2d 411, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that employer misclassified workers as inde-
pendent contractors to exclude them from benefits plan).
46 See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2002).  In addition to minimum
wage regulations, labor laws prohibit discrimination on the basis of union or concerted activ-
ity. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).  And employment discrimina-
tion laws prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age,
and disability. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).  However, pub-
lic law generally does not prohibit employers from purchasing labor on a non-employee con-
tract basis or dictate particular compensation levels.  An exception would be prevailing rates or
living wage regulations that require contractors with public employers to pay their employees
more than the required minimum wage.  For a discussion of the origin and operation of living
wage ordinances, see William Quigley, Full-Time Workers Should Not Be Poor: The Living
Wage Movement, 70 MISS. L.J. 889 (2001).
47 See Dana Mattioli, Salary Cuts: Ugly But It Could Be Worse, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9,
2009, at D1; Matt Richtel, More Companies Are Cutting Labor Costs Without Layoffs, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2008, at A1 (noting that Honda is offering unpaid vacation time and Dell is
offering unpaid holidays); Merritt Quisumbing, Choosing Where to Buy Groceries: The High
Price of Wal-Mart’s “Always Low Prices, Always,” 7 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 111, 127
(2005) (noting that Wal-Mart is requiring employee contributions to health insurance premi-
ums even though Wal-Mart workers already depend heavily on government-provided health
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nomic rewards are being reserved solely for productive output.
Employers are also restructuring the employment relationship to avoid
regulatory costs, such as those associated with labor and employment
laws, including medicare, unemployment insurance, social security pay-
ments, and workers’ compensation insurance.  By classifying workers as
contract laborers or independent contractors, businesses are circum-
venting regulations designed to give workers greater compensation.48
Additional, cost-cutting measures include layoffs with increased respon-
sibilities for the retained staff, hiring workers part-time with no benefits,
creating two-tiered compensation structures in which new employees get
paid substantially less than incumbents, automating operations, and out-
sourcing work to low-wage locales.49  For unionized employers with ac-
care); see also Fewer Americans Getting Employer-Based Coverage, 27 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA)
456 (Mar. 6, 2013) (reporting a decline in employer-provided health benefits from 49.2% in
2008 to 44.5% in 2012).
48 See DOL, Iowa Collaborate to Prevent Misclassification, 27 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA)
155 (Jan. 23, 2013) (noting that “[e]mployees who are misclassified as independent contractors
often are denied access to benefits and protections to which they are entitled, such as family
and medical leave, overtime compensation, minimum wage pay, and unemployment insur-
ance”); see also Vizcaino, 120 F.3d at 1006 (holding that workers did not waive their rights to
benefits although they signed labor contracts as independent contractors).  Leasing employees
from staffing companies is also common. See Contingent Workers: Firms Employed More
Temps in 2012 Averaging 2.9 Million Per Day, ASA Says, 41 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-5
(Mar. 3, 2013); see also Stephen J. Dunn & Karen B. Berkery, Employee Leasing: The Risk for
Lessees, 84 MICH. B. J. 22 (2005) (explaining the practice of leasing workers); Henry W.
Sledz, Jr. & John J. Lynch, The Legal Ramifications of Using Independent Contractors, Tem-
porary Agency Employee Leased Workers, 9 CHI. B. ASS’N REC. 20 (1995) (observing that
employers can avoid overhead, labor, tax, and employment regulatory costs by purchasing
labor on a non-employee contingent basis); Kenneth M. Casebeer, Of Service Workers, Con-
tracting Out, Joint Employment, Legal Consciousness, and the University of Miami, 56 BUFF.
L. REV. 1059, 1061 (2008) (arguing that the practice of contracting workers from another
employer impedes class consciousness and the prospects of organizing a union).
49 See Shobhana Chandra, Rise in Fourth-Quarter Productivity Helps to Restrain Busi-
ness Labor Costs, 25 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D-2 (Feb. 6, 2014) (observing that companies
“have been wringing efficiency gains from existing staff” to boost productivity); Karen A.
Doner, Stock Options Today, Jobless Tomorrow, 13 VA. EMP. L. LETTER 3 (2001) (discussing
massive layoffs at major companies such as Amazon, AOL Time Warner, General Electric,
and DaimlerChrysler); Steven Greenhouse & Reed Abelson, Small Employers Weigh Impact of
Providing Health Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2012, at B1 (listing several employers that
limit health benefits to full-time workers); Louis Uchitelle, Unions Yield On Pay Scales To
Keep Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2010, at A1 (discussing two-tiered system at GM, Chrysler,
Delphi, Caterpillar, Harley-Davidson, and Kohler, and reporting that those companies plan to
make this system permanent); Amy Harmon, More Consumers Reach Out to the Touch
Screen, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2003, at A1, A15 (discussing the implementation of automated
systems by several retail giants and Delta Airlines, that eliminated cashiers and other workers’
jobs); Heather Timmons, India Feels Less Vulnerable as Outsourcing Presses On, N.Y. TIMES,
June 3, 2009, at B1, B5 (discussing Hewlett-Packard and Honeywell’s outsourcing of software
testing and research work to India, resulting in job losses for their American workers).
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tive collective bargaining contracts, reduction in labor costs is achieved
through concession bargaining, and this practice is now routine.50
Demands for lower compensation rates are not always driven by a
firm’s weak economic position in its product market or a desire to avoid
threats to continuing operation, such as insolvency.51  Companies seek
the lowest possible compensation scales even when their profits are soar-
ing and their competitive positions are secure.52  And there are few legal
restraints on firms bargaining for this.  Minimum wage laws do not regu-
late an employer’s broad freedom to structure the employment relation-
ship in ways that limit the price that is paid for labor.53  This has forced
organized and unorganized workers to accept a smaller share of the prof-
its derived from their productive output.54  As a result, employees are
50 The “concession orgy” is said to have begun in the 1980s and continues today. See
Charles B. Craver, The Impact of Financial Crises Upon Collective Bargaining Relationships,
56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 465, 476 (1987); David Welch & Jeff Green, Carmakers Consider
Moving Work Abroad for Leverage, 29 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 1743 (Aug. 26, 2015); Union
OKs Cost-Saving Deal to Keep Jobs at United, 41 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-9 (Mar. 3, 2015)
(reporting an airline union’s decision to accept lower wages and the suspension of company
contributions to members’ 401(k) plans in order to prevent the outsourcing of jobs); Michael
Bologna, Steelworkers Accept Pact Freezing Wages for Six-Year Period and Suspending Pen-
sion, 27 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 1144 (June 19, 2013); Susan R. Hobbs, CWA, AT&T Negotia-
tions Continue After Contracts for 40,000 Workers Expire, 68 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-10
(Apr. 9, 2012) (reporting that AT&T was seeking concessions on health care, pensions, and
overtime pay, among other things); see also Tiziano Treu, General Report: Procedures and
Structures of Collective Bargaining at the Enterprise and Plant Levels, 7 COMP. LAB. L. 219,
245 (1986) (observing that concession bargaining has become common in the United States
and abroad); Michael Carrell & Richard Bales, Considering Final Offer Arbitration to Resolve
Public Sector Impasses in Times of Concession Bargaining, 28 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 6
(2013) (reporting the expansion of concession bargaining to the public sector).  Concession
bargaining is also undertaken to enhance profits. See Charles B. Craver, The Impact of Finan-
cial Crises Upon Collective Bargaining Relationships, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 465, 476
(1987).
51 Firms seeking cuts in pay and benefits to avoid economic disaster is not new or alarm-
ing but is in fact expected. See, e.g., Jeff Bailey, Northwest Attendants Agree to Concessions
As Pilots Continue Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2006, at C1 (reporting compensation reduction
demands as part of a bankruptcy reorganization plan).  However, demands for compensation
cuts are also being made in the interest of greater profits. See Craver, supra note 50, at 476. R
52 For example, the telephone company Verizon recently proposed freezing or eliminat-
ing pensions, limiting sick days to five per year, and requested worker contribution for health
insurance at a time when net income for the first half of 2011 was $6.9 billion. See Steven
Greenhouse, Citing Statements, Verizon Workers Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2011, at A14.
Despite reporting record profits in 2011 and forecasting even better results for 2012, Caterpil-
lar demanded a wage and pension freeze plus higher employee contributions to the health care
plan. See Steven Greenhouse, At Caterpillar, Pressing Labor For Concessions, N.Y. TIMES,
July 23, 2012, at A1.
53 Classifying and contracting with workers as independent contractors has long been a
strategy for avoiding minimum wage and overtime compensation laws. See Rutherford Food
Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729 (1947).
54 Unions have lost their most potent bargaining weapon, the strike, due to declining
membership and globalization. See Anna Stolley Persky, State of the Union: The Role of Labor
in America’s Future, WASH. LAWYER, July–Aug. 2011, at 28.  Employers can readily replace
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becoming more dependent on governmental agencies for economic
support.55
B. The Sharing of Profits as Corporate Social Responsibility
The drive to pay less for labor has intensified the debate about cor-
porate social responsibility and the role of unions in securing middle
class wages and reducing wage inequality.56  But because the law does
strikers, particularly when unemployment is high, and with global options to relocate it is now
very difficult to disrupt or cripple business operations with a strike. Id.  The absence of legal
protection for employees striking for better wages and benefits also deters strikes because such
strikers can be permanently replaced. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333
(1938); see also NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 381 (1967); United Steel,
Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l Union, AFL-
CIO v. NLRB, 544 F.3d 841 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that, after a strike, employers must not
discriminate against strikers in filling vacancies).  As a result, workers have no choice but to
surrender to employer demands. See Steven Greenhouse, Caterpillar Workers Ratify Deal
They Dislike, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2012, at B1 (reporting that striking workers approved a
contract that contained almost all the concessions demanded by the employer).
55 See Rhonda Smith, New Low-Wage Job Market Poses Challenges for Workers and the
Economy, Study Finds, 234 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-14 (Dec. 4, 2013) (reporting, for exam-
ple, that one third of bank tellers rely on some form of government assistance to make ends
meet, although they have a median annual income of $24,000 per year); see also Morgan
Housel, How You Subsidize the Minimum Wage, MOTLEY FOOL (Oct. 26, 2013), http://
www.fool.com/investing/general/2013/10/26/how-you-subsidize-the-minimum-wage.aspx (re-
porting that more than half of fast-food workers rely on public assistance to get by).  This
problem appears to be more pronounced in right-to-work states where such policies produce
jobs but also significantly reduce taxes from labor income at the state and federal levels,
thereby further depleting state budgets. See Report Says Right-to-Work States’ Workers Pay
Less in Taxes, Receive More in Public Aid, 28 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 2006 (Sept. 17, 2014).
56 But from the perspective of employers, businesses exist to profitably provide the
goods and services people want, not to provide economic security to workers.  Businesses also
pay taxes and create employment, and they seek to limit their social responsibility to these
objectives. See Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in the Era of Globaliza-
tion, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 714 (2002).  Company leaders feel they are accountable only
to stockholders whose money they spend and manage. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cycli-
cal Transformation of the Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social
Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767, 769 (2005).  This philosophy of stockholder primacy
has not lost any ground to constituency statutes which permit company directors to consider
the interests of other stakeholders such as employees, creditors, suppliers, or customers. See
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees As Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder Constit-
uency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45, 75 (1991) (noting that constituency statutes simply
expand management discretion without providing employees with enforceable rights).  And
even when company leaders choose to be socially responsible, they tend to prefer initiatives
that benefit stockholders. See Anthony Bisconti, The Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency
Statutes Protect Socially Responsible Corporations Stock in Revlon Land?, 42 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 765, 787 (2009).  Issues of wage sufficiency and pay disparities are viewed as matters to
be addressed by contractual arrangements and regulatory bodies. See Henry Hansmann &
Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441–42 (2001)
(noting that non-stockholder stakeholders such as workers must look to unions and labor and
employment laws to protect their interests); see also STIGLITZ, supra note 15, at 267–82 (ob- R
serving that corporations exercise an outsized influence on economic policy which has pro-
duced welfare and excessive gains for the wealthy, stagnant wages and economic loss for the
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not impose on businesses any social responsibility for the economic sta-
bility of workers, labor is generally treated as a factor of production to be
bought at market rates.57  As such, firms view a competitive wage as one
the worker individually negotiates that corresponds to his productive out-
put.58  The economic premiums above market rates that organized labor
seeks and secures are therefore in conflict with the interests of business
owners.59  In fact, business interests argue that above-market labor rates
also hurt society because they drive up production costs, reduce profit-
ability, force price increases to uncompetitive levels, cause layoffs, and
stymie business development or expansion.60
Labor supporters dispute these claims or the extent to which above-
market labor rates harm businesses, society, and other workers.61  From
labor’s standpoint, workers have a natural or moral right to a larger share
of the fruits of their productive efforts than the law recognizes.62  Wage
poor, and vilification of unions that function as a countervailing influence on corporate
power).
57 See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1921 (1996) (noting that the primary goal of corporate law is to
maximize stockholder wealth); HENRY G. MANNE & HENRY C. WALLICH, THE MODERN COR-
PORATION AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (1972) (stating that maximizing stockholder wealth is
the social responsibility of corporations).  Of course there are statutory declarations that the
purchase and sale of labor is not a purely economic transaction. See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§17 (2012) (declaring that the labor of humans is not a commodity); see also N.Y. CONST. art.
1, §17 (2002) (“Labor of human beings is not a commodity nor an article of commerce and
shall never be so considered or construed.”); see also Annette Burkeen, Private Ordering and
Institutional Choice: Defining the Role of Multinational Corporations in Promoting Global
Labor Standards, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 205, 231 (2007) (observing that the
search and competition for low labor rates are global).
58 See Thomas T. Campbell, Labor Law and Economics, 38 STAN. L. REV. 991, 1004–05
(1985).  This view has been affirmed in legal theory.  See Michael J. Zimmer, Unions & the
Great Recession: Is Transnationalism the Answer?, 15 EM. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 123–48
(2011) (“Neoliberalism assumes that labor relations is a zero-sum game between two players,
capital and labor: what one side gains, the other loses.”); James Gray Pope, Labor and the
Constitution: From Abolition to Deindustrialization, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1071, 1076 (1987) (not-
ing that since the Lochner era, courts endorsed classifying labor as a commodity subject to the
rules of the commercial marketplace).
59 See Campbell, supra note 58, at 1014 (noting that the purpose of unions is to seek a R
return above the value of work performed); see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 15–22 (1991) (noting that there is
an implicit contract between stockholders and the company in which the company promises to
maximize profits).
60 These claims find support in neoclassical economic theory. See Kenneth G. Dau-
Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis of American Labor Law and the Search for Bargaining Equity
and Industrial Peace, 91 MICH. L. REV. 419, 422 (1992).
61 See id. at 468–82 (arguing that above-market premiums come from employer profits
and increased productivity not at the expense of displaced employees or higher consumer
prices); see also FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 11, at 57 (arguing that the adverse economic R
effects of above-market rates are modest).
62 See KAHLENBERG & MARVIT, supra note 6, at 90 (arguing that the United States Con- R
stitution, statutory labor law, and international conventions support unionism as a human right
with its attendant democratic values and dignity); Leonard Page & Daniel W. Sherrick, The
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and benefit packages secured by unions are credited with improving
worker productivity, increasing workers’ purchasing power and the de-
mand for goods and services, and creating a stable democracy.63  Con-
gress vetted the economic claims of capital and organized labor during
the New Deal era, and settled on collective bargaining as the antidote for
worker vulnerability.64  And for a while, unions were able to defy the
rules of free market bargaining by using the clout they had acquired from
legal support for unionism.
II. CODIFICATION OF FREE MARKET COMPENSATION PRINCIPLES
It is often noted that unions succeed in driving up labor costs, caus-
ing companies to operate inefficiently and at a competitive disadvan-
tage.65  This claim has deep roots because historically unions demanded
and got higher wages and benefits and better working conditions for their
NLRB’s Deferral Policy and Union Reform: A Union Perspective, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
647, 649–50 (1991) (concluding that unions negotiate collective bargaining agreements in or-
der to fight for the economic security and workplace dignity of workers); Isadore Katz, Book
Review, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 571 (1954) (reviewing SELWYN H. TORFF, COLLECTIVE BARGAIN-
ING: NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENTS (1953)) (stating that it is through collective bargaining
agreements that trade unions seek protection of their members by compelling the adoption of
practices which will preserve the integrity of individuals and will provide economic security);
see also Charles Fried, Individual and Collective Rights in Work Relations: Reflections on the
Current State of Labor Law and Its Prospects, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1012, 1021–22 (1984).
63 See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 60, at 431–33.  The link between productivity levels and R
wage levels is documented in the literature on efficiency wage theory. See ROBERT L.
HENEMAN, MERIT PAY: LINKING PAY INCREASES TO PERFORMANCE RATINGS 39–40 (1992);
Donald G. Gifford, A Context-Based Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal Negotiation, 46
OHIO ST. L.J. 41, 90 (1985) (asserting that positive results arising out of collective bargaining
negotiations include increase in workers’ morale and discipline). But see John T. Addison &
Barry T. Hirsch, Union Effects on Productivity, Profits, and Growth: Has the Long Run Ar-
rived?, 7 J. LAB. ECON. 72, 79–81 (1989) (questioning the claim that unionized firms are more
productive, and concluding that the union effect on productivity is small or negative).
64 See generally National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §151–169 (2012).  Congress
found that individual employees bargaining with corporate employers lacked any real liberty
of contract so employees’ right to organize unions and bargain collectively needed to be pro-
tected in order to prevent labor strife and the “diminution of employment and wages in such
volume as substantially to impair or disrupt the market for goods flowing from or into the
channels of commerce.” Id. § 151.
65 See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 11, at 3 (explaining the monopoly view of un- R
ions which emphasizes the wage premium unions exact and its associated negative conse-
quences such as lower output and employment); see also Richard B. Freeman & James L.
Medoff, The Two Faces of Unionism, 57 PUB. INT. 76 (1979) (noting that the cartel theory of
unions posits that unions force employers to hire or retain more workers than necessary, nego-
tiate job restrictions that limit productivity, and otherwise reduce output by requiring more
capital per worker than is economically efficient); Cynthia L. Estlund, Economic Rationality
and Union Avoidance: Misunderstanding the National Labor Relations Act, 71 TEX. L. REV.
921, 922 (1993) (noting the employer’s perspective that unions demand a greater share of the
firm’s profits by increasing labor costs, which drive up prices and reduce sales which are taken
by lower cost competitors); Gifford, supra note 63, at 89 (asserting that management’s under- R
lying interest when in collective bargaining is minimizing total compensation costs).
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members than they would otherwise obtain in the free market.66  Thus,
when collective bargaining contracts are successfully negotiated, union-
ized workers likely secure better compensation packages than their at-
will counterparts.  From a business perspective, this is a bad result be-
cause labor costs above market rates negatively impact employers, soci-
ety at large, and workers generally.67  Specifically, it is contended that
higher labor costs reduce profitability and competitiveness, drive up the
price for goods and services (inflation), and reduce employment with less
hiring and investment.68
A. National Regulation of Wage Bargaining (Congress, the Courts,
and the NLRB)
The economic claims of business owners were well known when the
decision was made to regulate union activity as part of the New Deal.
Congress knew that unions pursued above-market pay rates and benefits
while companies actively worked to reduce labor costs.  The declared
national policy in the NLRA sided with labor, as Congress denounced
unregulated market outcomes as burdensome to commerce and harmful
to workers.69  Nonetheless, Congress did not enact a rule that guaranteed
unionized workers a living wage.  Instead, Congress left wage outcomes
to unregulated bargaining with results dependent on the economic
66 See David G. Blanchflower & Alex Bryson, What Effect Do Unions Have on Wages
Now and Would Freeman and Medoff Be Surprised?, 25 J. LAB. RES. 383, 396 (2004) (com-
menting on the contracting successes of unions during the 1970s and 80s and their effects on
future employment); Zev J. Eigen & David Sherwyn, A Moral/Contractual Approach to Labor
Law Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 695, 702 (2012) (“According to organized labor, unions con-
sistently provide higher wages and greater job security.”); see also Anne Marie Lofaso, To-
ward a Foundational Theory of Workers’ Rights: The Autonomous Dignified Worker, 76
UMKC L. REV. 1, 17 (2007) (asserting that “the collective nature of unions empowers them to
fix wages at a level higher than would be dictated by the free market”).  Although at-will
employees are now catching up, unionized workers continue to draw better pay and benefits.
See Nonunion Workers See Sharper Wage Gain; Pay and Benefits Still Lag Behind Unionized,
26 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 2320 (Dec. 19, 2012) (reporting average hourly pay of $23.51 for
unionized workers and $20.04 for their nonunion counterparts, and cost to employers for pro-
viding benefits of $15.65 for unionized workers and $7.86 for their nonunion counterparts).
67 See Estlund, supra note 65, at 941–42 (noting that employers often relocate operations R
to nonunion areas or eliminate jobs because of the higher labor costs associated with collective
bargaining); see also Eigen & Sherwyn, supra note 66, at 703–04 (noting that increased salary R
expenses due to union-imposed wage increases reduce employer profits and cause U.S. manu-
facturers to outsource their production of goods); Dau-Schmidt, supra note 60, at 422 (assert- R
ing that the traditional economic analysis of unions and collective bargaining argues that
unions gain benefits for some workers “at the expense of consumers, other workers, and eco-
nomic efficiency” because employers respond to union gains by “raising prices, cutting output,
substituting capital for labor, and laying off workers”).
68 See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 11, at 3. R
69 See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\25-3\CJP302.txt unknown Seq: 18 31-MAY-16 15:59
618 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 25:601
strength of the parties.70  Employers, already bargaining giants under the
common law, were left free under the NLRA to bargain to impasse and
continue operations without a contract or their unionized employees.71
Unions could only levy economic pressure with strikes to force employer
concessions, but strikers ran the risk of being replaced permanently.72
Despite congressional claims of equalizing the parties’ bargaining
power, the NLRA did not impose on employers any economic responsi-
bility for their workers or grant economic rights to unions.73  The NLRA
simply stated that it was an unfair labor practice for an employer to re-
fuse to bargain with the representative of its employees.74  Congress’ de-
cision to leave all substantive post-recognition bargaining issues to
market forces was an affirmation of employer common law preroga-
tives.75  The NLRA did not require employers to cede or share profits
with workers, and it permitted them to substitute unorganized labor if
unions went on strike to enforce contract proposals.76  Further, unionized
companies could justify harsh economic positions by pointing to the
lower labor costs of their unorganized competitors.77
70 See Stewart J. Schwab, Collective Bargaining and the Coase Theorem, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 245, 254 (1986).
71 See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
72 See id. at 345–46 (stating that an employer has the legal right to continue operations
by filling positions made vacant by striking employees and is not required to fire the striker
replacements when strikers choose to return to work).  Only if workers are forced to strike
because of an employer’s illegal practices are they guaranteed their jobs. See Mastro Plastics
Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 288–89 (1958); Paul Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom
of Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351, 394 (1984)
(arguing that striker replacement laws give employers too much power over workers); Michael
H. LeRoy, Regulating Employer Use of Permanent Striker Replacements: Empirical Analysis
of NLRA and RLA Strikers, 1935–1991, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 169 (1995) (noting
that striker replacement law is a contentious labor law issue); JULIUS G. GETMAN, RESTORING
THE POWER OF UNIONS 229–30 (2010) (observing that the right to strike was a power equalizer
under the NLRA but the law of striker replacements has forced unions to abandon this eco-
nomic weapon).
73 See NLRB v. Ins. Agents’ Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, 361 U.S. 477, 485–86 (1960) (not-
ing that “Congress was generally not concerned with the substantive terms on which the par-
ties contracted” and stating that the NLRB cannot function as arbiter of what concessions an
employer must make).
74 See id. at 483 (“The bill which became the Wagner Act included no provision specifi-
cally imposing a duty on either party to bargain collectively . . . .  However, the Senate com-
mittee in charge of the bill concluded that it was desirable to include a provision making it an
unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively in order to assure that the
Act would achieve its primary objective of requiring an employer to recognize a union selected
by his employees as their representative.”).  Management’s bargaining duty is therefore a co-
rollary of its recognition obligation. Id. at 484–85.
75 For example, some employers refused to meet or talk with the unions their employees
selected. See Int’l Filter Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 489 (1936); Jackson Daily News, Inc., 9 N.L.R.B.
120 (1938).
76 See generally 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
77 See, e.g., CalMat Co., 331 N.L.R.B. 1084 (2000).
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To limit the effects of the economic and bargaining imbalance that
the NLRA endorsed, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) con-
cluded that the parties must at least talk in good faith and in a sincere and
open-minded fashion about economic matters.78  The determination that
employers must talk to unions about economic issues raised questions
about the extent to which an employer’s common law contractual liber-
ties were abrogated.  The NLRA’s constitutionality was challenged on
several grounds, including that the federal government cannot regulate
labor-contracting freedoms.79  But the Court rejected this challenge, find-
ing that although the NLRA made an employee’s statutory representative
exclusive, it did not preclude employers from making individual con-
tracts, nor did it compel employers and employees to make contracts.80
Although the Court declared that the NLRA gave workers funda-
mental rights to organize and choose a bargaining representative,81 it was
emphatic that employers’ contracting freedoms were undisturbed.82  The
Court ruled that “[t]he Act does not compel agreements between employ-
ers and employees.  It does not compel any agreement whatever.  It does
not prevent the employer ‘from refusing to make a collective contract
and hiring individuals on whatever terms’ the employer ‘may by unilat-
eral action determine.’”83
The declaration that employers had no contracting obligation at the
bargaining table reinforced concerns that the NLRB was using its good
faith bargaining doctrine to interfere with the substantive aspects of labor
contracting.  To address this complaint, Congress amended the NLRA to
specify that employers’ contract-making liberties were fundamental
rights.  Congress added section 8(d) to the NLRA to expressly limit the
parties’ bargaining obligation to meeting and discussing “wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment.”84  Congress also made it
78 See Int’l Filter Co., 1 N.L.R.B. at 499. See also NLRB v. Boss Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d
187, 189 (7th Cir. 1941); Globe Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1939); Marc
Mandelman & Kevin Manara, Staying Above the Surface—Surface Bargaining Claims Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 24 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 261 (2007) (observing that
the NLRB developed the good faith doctrine “to balance the perceived inequitable bargaining
status between unions and employers”).
79 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 25 (1937).  In addition to
arguing that the NLRA was labor regulation cloaked as interstate commerce regulation, the
employer also made Fifth and Seventh Amendment arguments. Id.
80 See id. at 44–45.
81 See id. at 33 (citing NLRA § 7).  Section 7 of the NLRA gives employees the right to
form, join, or assist unions, to choose a bargaining representative, and to engage in concerted
activities.
82 See id. at 45; see also Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations,
68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1000 (1955) (noting that the NLRA did not encroach on the parties’
contractual liberties).
83 Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 45.
84 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012).
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textually clear that the NLRA did not require that an employer make any
concessions, agree to any proposal, or reach an overall agreement with a
union.85  Congress did not require that employers trade reasonably or
fairly at the bargaining table, only that they bargain in good faith.86
To satisfy the obligation of good faith, employers only need to ar-
rive at the bargaining table with a genuine desire to reach an agree-
ment.87  To test the employer’s resolve, the NLRB can evaluate whether
the employer has an open mind and is honest in its claims.88  The NLRB
can also determine whether bargaining positions must be substantiated,89
and whether an employer is merely going through the motions, or worse,
making proposals that are predictably unworkable.90  Surface bargaining
or behavior designed to inhibit contract formation is deemed an unfair
labor practice.91  But the penalties for such violations are extremely
weak—essentially limited to cease-and-desist orders and posting
notices.92
The U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that the NLRB cannot do
more when an employer fails to satisfy this limited obligation.  In H.K.
Porter Co. v. NLRB,93 the Court was asked to decide whether the NLRB
may order an employer to accept a proposal it had rejected in bad faith.94
The D.C. Circuit had reasoned that the NLRB could do this as part of its
remedial authority, which was not expressly constrained by section
8(d)’s liberty of contract rules.95  But the Court disagreed, holding that
the NLRA’s freedom of contract origin is so fundamental and compelling
that the NLRB’s remedial authority must defer to it.96  Citing section
85 See id.
86 Id.
87 See NLRB v. Ins. Agents’ Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, 361 U.S. 477, 485 (1960); see also
Altorfer Mach. Co., 332 N.L.R.B. 130, 148–59 (2000) (noting that surface bargaining occurs
when a party’s overall conduct demonstrates an intent to avoid reaching an agreement).
88 See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956).
89 See id. at 151–52.
90 See NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229, 232 (5th Cir. 1960).
91 See id.
92 See Borg-Warner Controls v. UAW Local 509, 198 N.L.R.B. 726, 739 (1972).
93 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
94 See id. at 102.  The union had proposed that the company deduct union dues from
union members’ paychecks (dues check off). Id. at 100.  The company rejected this proposal
as purely union business with which it was not going to assist the union. Id. at 101.  The
rejection was not part of a bargaining strategy nor did the company cite any operational bur-
dens or inconvenience the proposal would impose on it. Id. at 100–01.  The NLRB determined
that the sole purpose of the refusal was to frustrate the formation of a contract, and therefore,
the refusal was bad faith conduct. Id. at 101.
95 See id. at 107.  The D.C. Circuit reasoned that the non-intervention liberty of contract
commands of § 8(d) related only to the contract-making process. Id. Once it was determined
that a bargaining violation occurred, § 8(d)’s free market rules did not prohibit the government
from ordering a remedy designed to cure the violation. Id.
96 See id. at 107–08.  The Court decided that although the appellate court’s interpretation
of § 8(d) was sound, its remedial conclusion was wrong. Id.  The Court held that the NLRB’s
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8(d)’s text and legislative history, the Court ruled that the clear purpose
of this provision is to prevent the government from forcing the parties to
agree on substantive contract terms.97  Whether the parties agree to any-
thing is to be determined by their bargaining strengths with government
involvement limited to supervising the contracting process.98  In so rul-
ing, the Court confirmed that the employer’s common law contractual
liberties are secure even when they violate the law.
Armed with this powerful bargaining prerogative, companies have
used section 8(d)’s free market embrace to insist on their legal right to
structure compensation based on market forces.  To this end, employers
have demanded compensation structures that are competitive in the spe-
cific areas of wage and benefits even if overall profitability is high.
Often relying on their non-union competitors as comparators, firms have
insisted on labor cost proposals that brought them in line with such com-
petition, even if this forced workers to give up vested rights.99  This can
be done simply by identifying the compensation structure of a competitor
and comparing that to the company’s pay and benefits structure.  The
following historical examples demonstrate how easily legitimate conces-
sion bargaining by a profitable employer can be accomplished when it is
grounded in labor cost disadvantage.
B. Pursuing Market Rates for Labor Under the NLRA
In Empire Terminal Warehouse Co., the employer proposed a re-
duction of wages from $2 to $1.60 per hour based on a survey of its non-
union competitors’ wage rates.100  The survey showed competitors pay-
ing between $1.40 and $1.56 per hour.101  And although the company
was very successful and profitable, it declared an unwillingness to pay a
remedial authority was constrained by the Act’s fundamental policy of non-intervention when
attempts at contracting fail. Id.  Further, the Act’s legislative history and statutory precedents
made it crystal clear that the NLRB could not impose contract terms on the parties, but could
only supervise the framework for negotiations. See id. at 103–06.
97 See id. at 103–06.
98 Id. at 108.  Soon after the H.K. Porter Co. decision, the NLRB reaffirmed the Act’s
free market principles in Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 108–10 (1970).  In this case, the
employer refused to engage in any bargaining with the union, and the trial examiner concluded
that this conduct violated the Act. Id. at 108.  The trial examiner issued a bargaining order,
and also ordered the company to pay the workers for losses attributable to the violation. Id.
The NLRB rejected the compensation order, noting that its broad remedial authority does not
extend to compelling the parties to agree or punishing parties that fail to agree. Id.
99 See, e.g., A-1 Door & Bldg. Solutions, 356 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (Jan. 11, 2011); Caldwell
Mfg. Co., 346 N.L.R.B. 1159, 1160 (2006); Media Gen. Operations, Inc., 345 N.L.R.B. 195,
196–97 (2005); AMF Trucking & Warehousing, Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 1125, 1126–27 (2004);
Burruss Transfer, Inc., 307 N.L.R.B. 226, 227–28 (1992); Nielsen Lithographing Co., 305
N.L.R.B. 697, 699–701 (1991).
100 151 N.L.R.B. 1359, 1361 (1965).
101 Id. at 1368.
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higher wage than its competitors.102  Analogizing labor to  commodities,
the company explained “that it would not pay 35 cents a gallon for gaso-
line if it could get it for 25 cents, nor $5,000 for a truck which it could
buy for $4,000.”103
When the union demanded the company’s books and financial
records that substantiated it could not pay higher wages, the company
noted that it was not pleading poverty or inability to pay; only that its
wage scale was not competitive and this caused it to lose out on ac-
counts.104  Instead of opening its books, the company provided the union
with a survey showing that unorganized competitors paid lower rates,
and asked the union for a counterproposal that could make it economi-
cally competitive.105  The union responded with a proposal that new em-
ployees start at a rate below $2 per hour, but did not budge on its
proposal for a twenty-five cent increase for incumbents.106  However, the
employer insisted on $1.60 per hour as a maximum and implemented its
wage proposal when the collective bargaining contract expired, without
violating its bargaining obligation under the NLRA.107
General Dynamics Corp., Electric Boat Division provides another
example.108  In this case, an extremely profitable defense contractor
sought concessions from the union in order to align its workers’ wages
with those of a competitor.109  General Dynamics argued that its Electric
Boat Division, which designs and builds submarines, was at a competi-
tive disadvantage because unionized workers’ wages were about $2 per
hour higher than what was paid by their competitor Newport News.110
The company made this determination by comparing the wage rates in its
collective bargaining contract with those of the workers at Newport
News, who were also unionized.111  Based on this comparison, the com-
pany asked for a wage freeze and other economic concessions.
The union rejected the employer’s contention that it was operating
at a competitive disadvantage and requested cost projections, overhead,
revenues, and profit data, among other things, to evaluate the company’s
102 Id. at 1376.  In a letter to the union, the company explicitly stated that the company “is
not pleading an inability to pay and has never done so in any bargaining session . . . . This
company is a profitable operation but feels it is not good business to pay excessive wages.” Id.
103 Id. at 1367.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 1368–69.
106 Id. at 1368.
107 Id. at 1372.  The NLRB found that “Respondent did not refuse to bargain . . . by
putting into effect decreased wage rates concerning which it had formerly given notice and
consulted with the Union.” Id. at 1373.
108 Nos. 39-CA-1703 & 39-CA-1734, 1984 NLRB GCM LEXIS 166 (1984).
109 Id. at 5.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 8.  The comparison showed that Newport News had lower contract wages and
less non-productive paid time off than the Electric Boat Division. Id.
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contention.112  The union also wanted information about the company’s
“forward pricing” estimates to be used on future bids since these were
premised on possible wage increases.113  In response, the company re-
fused the information request and clarified that it was claiming “wage
disparity,” rather than “cost disparity,” based on a comparison of two
collective bargaining contracts.114  From the employer’s perspective,
merely pointing to a competitor’s low wage rates substantiated its claim
of competitive disadvantage, so it did not have to provide additional in-
formation to the union.
The NLRB ruled for the employer, reasoning that the union failed to
rebut the employer’s contention that it was operating at a competitive
disadvantage.115  The claim by union officials that wage costs at New-
port News were higher than suggested by their labor contract was not
persuasive because the union provided no documentary evidence to rebut
the express disparities between the two contracts.116  In any event, the
NLRB was persuaded that wage costs affected competitiveness because
the government intended to award future contracts to the lowest bidder,
and submarine design jobs were cost-plus contracts.117  Further, the com-
pany demonstrated that while escalating costs can be recouped, such de-
velopments reduced profitability because profits are limited to a
percentage of the estimated cost originally given in the bid.118
Ameron Pipe Products119 provides another example.  Here, the em-
ployer negotiated for wage cuts from $12.68 to become more competi-
tive with its primary competitor, Northwest Pipe, whose employees were
represented by the same union.120  The company claimed that it needed a
wage scale that matched its competitor’s to be competitive and expressly
stated that it was not claiming inability to pay.121  To support the claim
that it was not competitive, the company provided the union with data
showing it had lost eleven jobs to Northwest Pipe and its wages of $10
112 Id. at 8–9.
113 Id. at 13–14.
114 Id. at 11.
115 Id. at 28.
116 Id. at 28 n.26.
117 Id. at 27.
118 Id. at 13.
119 Ameron Pipe Prods., 305 N.L.R.B. 105, 106 (1991).
120 Id. at 106–08.
121 Id. at 106–07 (noting that the company “consistently responded that it was not plead-
ing poverty or inability to pay and that it was claiming that the Company was not
competitive”).
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per hour.122  Ameron also provided data showing a steady decline in pro-
duction attributable to the lost projects.123
Despite the employer’s expressions to the contrary, the union inter-
preted the employer’s position as one of inability to pay, particularly
after the company stated that it needed the wage concessions to stay in
business and survive.124  The union then asked for financial data, includ-
ing tax returns, to evaluate the company’s “fiscal condition,” but the
company refused.125  The NLRB decided that this refusal did not violate
the NLRA because the company posited that it was only willing to pay
prevailing rates, and in particular, the wage rate of its primary competi-
tor, because failure to do so would lead to further loss of work.126  Be-
cause the company was not citing its financial condition as the
justification for wage cuts, the union could not demand data to evaluate
the company’s fiscal condition.127
A company is also free to demand concessions based on the pay and
benefit structure of its non-union competitors.  In CalMat Co. and Inter-
national Union of Operating Engineers, Local 12, AFL-CIO, the com-
pany sought reductions in its pay and pension benefits, citing a tough
economic climate in the rock, sand, and gravel industry.128  Specifically,
the company wanted to remain competitive with non-union competitors
who paid less than the company had agreed to in its expired collective
bargaining contract.129  CalMat provided the union with the names and
pay scales of several companies that paid less, but argued that the proper
122 Id. at 110 (“The data supplied to the Union showed that 11 of the jobs that had been
bid on by the Company had been awarded to Northwest Pipe and that the total value of those
jobs was over $13 million.”)
123 Id. (stating that the company supplied the union with data showing “the Company’s
production [levels], average number of employees, hours worked and corresponding man years
for the years 1972 to 1985,” in addition to “projections to cover the years 1986 and 1987”).
124 Id. at 108.  The union claimed that the company had “crossed the threshold” by re-
questing concessions in order to stay competitive, which brought the company within the area
which the union claimed the NLRB ruled entitled them to financial information. Id.
125 Id.  Ameron stated that the union’s insistence on financial data as a pre-condition to
further economic bargaining was “wholly inappropriate” due to the fact that Ameron was not
claiming an inability to pay, only that it refused to pay uncompetitive rates. Id.
126 Id. at 110.  The union was fully aware of the company’s situation in respect to its main
competitor, Northwest Pipe, because the union was also Northwest Pipe’s collective bargain-
ing agent. Id.
127 Id.  The company claimed that its decision not to pay more than it was offering did not
subject it to verification or refutation by an examination of the company’s books by the union.
Id. Additionally, the NLRB found valid the company’s belief that it “could not” secure work
in the future if it was not competitive, and did not subject the company to affirmation or
refutation by an inquiry into its present, general financial condition. Id.
128 331 N.L.R.B. 1084, 1085–86 (2000).
129 Id.  The expired agreement included union-won increases in wage rates and health and
welfare benefits. Id.
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marketplace comparison should be Owl Rock, its chief non-union
competitor.130
The union also asked for financial records and reports in the com-
pany’s possession or control related to competitors’ productivity, labor
and material cost, prices, profits and losses.131  The company refused,
claiming that such financial data was irrelevant.132  The NLRB agreed
with the employer’s contention that it had satisfied its bargaining obliga-
tion in this case.133  Starting from the premise that the union must prove
relevance of information about competitors’ operations or employees, the
NLRB found that CalMat made that information relevant by alleging
noncompetitiveness with non-union companies.134  However, the union
only asked for information in CalMat’s possession or control, and the
company did not have data “concerning its competitors’ productivity, la-
bor and material costs, prices, or profitability.”135  Since the company
did not have this information and did not have a duty to obtain it under
the circumstances, it satisfied its bargaining obligations.136  The em-
ployer’s market comparison was essentially limited to Owl Rock, and it
provided the union with wage data for this employer.137  Therefore,
CalMat did not violate the NLRA when it unilaterally implemented its
economic proposals after bargaining to impasse.138
These historical cases show that requests for concessions by profita-
ble firms were tied to claims of competitive disadvantage in the area of
labor costs.  Such claims were easily substantiated by providing data on
the pay and benefits structure of competitors, union or nonunion.  But the
NLRA does not limit concession bargaining to situations where compa-
nies cite competitive disadvantage.  Employers are free to rely on a gen-
eral desire to be efficient, a drive to be more profitable, or a push to
increase stockholder value as the justification for seeking concessions.
130 Id. at 1089.
131 Id. at 1088.
132 Id. at 1088–89.
133 Id. at 1097.
134 Id. at 1096.  The NLRB noted that where “an employer relies upon its alleged non-
competitiveness with nonunion employers, information concerning the nonunion employers is
clearly relevant.” Id.  Further, more extensive data—such as a competitor’s productivity,
prices, and labor and material costs—could ordinarily help the union evaluate the employer’s
need for concessions on wages and benefits. Id. at 1096–97.  By evaluating broad economic
data of a competitor, the union might be able to come up with economic alternatives to make
the employer competitive, such as increasing productivity or reducing costs elsewhere. Id. at
1097.
135 Id. at 1095.
136 Id. at 1096 (holding that CalMat had provided all of the information it had in its
possession and control to the Union and was not obligated to obtain information it did not
have).
137 Id. at 1095.
138 Id. at 1097.
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Even if the firm faces no labor cost or product competition, it could ask
workers for concessions based on economic conditions or the labor mar-
ket.  For example, companies could rely on the abundant supply of labor
at low prices to demand that incumbent employees accept less.  And,
increasingly, employers are doing this to further efficiency goals or
stockholders’ interests, proving to workers that unions can deliver little
more than market rates for labor.
III. THE AGGRAVATING EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION
In enacting the NLRA in 1935, Congress said it was responding to
the fact that individual workers had no real liberty of contract when sell-
ing their labor in a free market that was neither moral nor efficient.139
To provide a countervailing force to powerful corporate bargainers, Con-
gress empowered unions to bargain on behalf of worker groups or collec-
tives.140  The system of collective bargaining that was endorsed by the
New Deal NLRA did not limit an employer’s economic power at the
bargaining table, nor did it increase the economic rights of unionized
workers.141  This was the contextual framework within which the NLRB
formulated and imposed a good faith bargaining obligation on
employers.142
But as the strength of unions grew with increasing union density,
unions were able to make demands that had to be taken seriously.143
Strikes that could cripple a business or impose significant economic
losses helped to persuade companies to share their good fortunes with
their workers.144  Unions also secured contracts by organizing whole in-
139 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012).  Specifically, Congress found that:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full free-
dom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in
the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and af-
fects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions,
by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and
by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions
within and between industries.
Id. § 151.
140 See id. § 151; see also J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 339 (1944) (noting that
the majority rule principle of the NLRA “collectivizes the employment bargain”).
141 See Schwab, supra note 70, at 254 (noting that the NLRA is premised on capitalism, R
private bargaining, and the economic strength of the parties); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The
Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and the
New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 589–90 (1992) (observing
that market factors such as efficiency and profitability control and insulate the employer’s
bargaining obligation).
142 See Emmett P. O’Neill, The Good Faith Requirement in Collective Bargaining, 21
MONT. L. REV. 202, 202–03 (1960).
143 See GETMAN, supra note 72, at 269–70. R
144 See id. at 229–30 (observing that the strike weapon was a power equalizer under the
NLRA, but this weapon was neutralized by the judicial determination that employers may
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dustries and negotiating standard contract terms, which eliminated wage
competition between employers.145  Many companies, sheltered from
global competition, were able to absorb union markups or pass them on
to consumers.146  Union demands for higher pay than the free market
rate, along with requests for health benefits and pension plans, drove up
operating costs and influenced competitiveness and efficiency.147  But
with the advent of global wage competition, employers are unwilling or
unable to absorb these labor costs.148
A. Compensation Costs for Workers Classified as Employees in a
Global Economy
Paying wages above market rates to attract, retain, and motivate
workers can inflate an already significant labor bill because, by law, cer-
tain costs such as Social Security, Medicare, unemployment insurance,
and workers’ compensation insurance may be unavoidable.149  And the
cost of these benefits is usually tied to workers’ salaries.  For example,
permanently replace strikers); Div. 1287 v. Missouri, 374 U.S. 74, 82 (1963) (finding that the
right to strike is at the “core” of collective bargaining); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S.
221, 234 (1963) (finding that the strike is “an economic weapon which in great measure imple-
ments and supports the principles of the collective bargaining system”).
145 See AIDT & TZANNATOS, supra note 15, at 56–58; Zimmer, supra note 58, at 154 R
(citing the auto industry as an example where this practice worked in the past).
146 See Zimmer, supra note 58; see also Fried, supra note 62, at 1030 (noting that with R
government protection or regulation, employers could pass union premiums on to consumers).
147 See Renae Broderick & Barry Gerhart, Non-Wage Compensation, in 3 The Human
Resource Management Handbook 145–73 (David Lewin et al. eds., 1997); see also FREEMAN
& MEDOFF, supra note 11, at 181–84 (concluding that unions lower profitability and that the R
benefits of unionism do not offset union costs).
148 See Lucy B. Bednarek, The Gender Wage Gap: Searching for Equality in a Global
Economy, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 213, 217 (1998) (stating that structural changes
resulting from globalization usher in a more flexible workforce with reduced labor regulations
and costs that ultimately devalue labor).  The effects of structural changes in the economy and
wage competition from foreign workers were already noticeable over a quarter of a century
ago. See Abner J. Mikva, The Changing Role of the Wagner Act in the American Labor
Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1123, 1131–32 (1986).  Global wage competition has combined
with a stockholder primacy culture to put downward pressure on wages for most workers while
promoting the interests of senior managers.  See Susan J. Stabile, One for A, Two for B, and
Four Hundred for C: The Widening Gap in Pay Between Executives and Rank and File Em-
ployees, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 115, 118 (2002) (identifying shareholder primacy philoso-
phy as the cause of the dramatic disparity between executive pay and that of other workers).
See also Estlund, supra note 65, at 950 (noting that product market competition has increased R
with globalization and this has encouraged employers to pursue a low-wage strategy); Fried,
supra note 62, at 1030 (observing that the regulated or protected industries of old could pass R
labor costs on to consumers and thereby absorb union premiums, but this is no longer possible
with global competition).
149 See Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 401–433 (1994 & Supp. II 1996); Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C.
§§ 3301–3311 (2012).  Workers’ compensation insurance is governed by state law. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. § 440.01 (2015); HAW. REV. STAT. § 386-1 (2015); MO. REV. STAT. § 287.280.1
(2015).
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Social Security is financed by a payroll tax shared by the employer and
the worker.150  It is estimated that required benefits add an additional
7.9% to labor costs in private industry.151  Employers also provide other
economic benefits voluntarily.
Total compensation often includes additional benefits that are vol-
untarily provided or ceded through contract negotiations.  Typically, em-
ployers provide paid holidays, paid vacation, and paid sick leave in
addition to paying premiums for other benefits, such as health insurance
and pension plans.152  Today in the United States, the benefits compo-
nent can represent about thirty percent of total hourly compensation.153
In September 2015, the manufacturing sector reported total hourly com-
pensation cost of $37.70, with average hourly wage at $24.57 and bene-
fits costing $13.13 per hour.154
For pay and voluntary benefits, unionized workers in September
2015 fared better than at-will employees because of the bargaining suc-
cess of unions.  While unionized workers received average hourly wages
of $27.87 and benefits of $18.51, their at-will counterparts received
$21.39 in wages and $8.65 in benefits.155  And the cost for health insur-
ance for unionized workers was more than double that of unorganized
employees: $5.77 versus $2.11 per hour.156  Because union presence has
driven up the breadth and cost of discretionary benefits, unions and the
workers they represent have been blamed for saddling companies with
unsustainable compensation debts that have contributed to or caused bus-
iness failures.157
150 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 401–433 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
151 See News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employer Costs For Employee Com-
pensation—September 2015 (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/
ecec_12092015.pdf.
152 See Andrea H. Brustein, Casual Workers and Employee Benefits: Staying Ahead of the
Curve, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 695, 696 (2005).
153 See News Release, supra note 151 (reporting that benefits accounted for 31.4% of R
total compensation in September 2015).
154 See id. at 21 tbl.12.
155 Id. at 10 tbl.5.
156 Id.
157 See generally Peter Linneman & Michael L. Wachter, Rising Union Premiums and the
Declining Boundaries Among Noncompeting Groups, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 103 (1986); see also
GETMAN, supra note 72, at 22 (noting that the economic woes of American auto companies R
were attributed to burdensome union contracts); STIGLITZ, supra note 15, at 229 (noting that R
workers’ pursuit of higher wages and greater job security have been blamed for the economic
woes of the country); Carey Gillam & Tanya Agrawal, Twinkies Maker Hostess Plans to Go
Out of Business, REUTERS (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/17/us-
hostess-bankruptcy-idUSBRE8AF0OW20121117#WG79Y18TaVHMwpjW.97 (reporting that
the 82-year-old company blamed its demise on labor troubles, including burdensome wages
and pension plans, union refusal to make concessions, and strikes).
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B. Employers’ Response to the Wage Bill in a Global Economy with
Weaker Unions
As the previous section shows, companies have consistently fought
back when unions made wage and benefits demands, and the NLRA
makes it easy for them to do so.  But now, a more competitive world
economy and low union density have combined to magnify the employer
bargaining advantage under the NLRA.  For over a quarter century,
union membership and the ability to wage effective strikes to secure eco-
nomic demands have consistently declined.158  Economic realities have
also changed with a decline in the manufacturing sector where unions
were strong, along with the removal of trade and competition barriers
which allow employers to freely move capital or production to nonunion
locales.159  While these developments have expanded employers’ labor
contracting power, unions’ bargaining power has declined with the
growth of right-to-work laws and worker ambivalence.160
The NLRA continues to embrace employer bargaining freedoms as
an indefeasible fundamental right that takes priority over worker eco-
nomic security.  And employers’ bargaining strength has grown with
greater wage competition at the national level,161 as well as internation-
ally, because of the removal of trade and investment barriers which
opened overseas labor markets with lower labor costs.162  Many employ-
ers have the bargaining clout to propose lower compensation or threaten
158 Gerald E. Berendt et al., The Labor Strike: Is It Still a Useful Economic Weapon for
Unions?, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 255, 277 (2002) (discussing the dramatic decline of strike
activity and the ramifications for unions).
159 See Craver, supra note 50, at 466–67, 482 (observing that economic and technological R
shifts have blunted the strike weapon by reducing union density and providing many non-
union operating alternatives for employers).
160 The absence of regulatory change is compounded by public ambivalence about unions.
See Poll Finds Most Americans Favor Unions, While Even More Back Right-to-Work Laws,
169 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-8 (Sept. 2, 2014) (reporting that a slight majority of Americans
approve of unions while a larger percentage support laws that deny unions financial support);
see also Steven Greenhouse, A Challenge for Unions in Public Opinion, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2,
2011), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/02/a-challenge-for-unions-in-public-opin-
ion/ (reporting that in 2009 unions had the lowest approval rating since Gallup started tracking
this issue in 1936).
161 See David Welch & Jeff Green, Carmakers Consider Moving Work Abroad for Lever-
age, 29 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 1743 (Aug. 26, 2015); see also Ben Penn, Trade with Low-Wage
Nations Decreases Income for Less-Educated U.S. Workers, 27 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 641
(Apr. 3, 2013) (“Once American workers in sectors such as manufacturing are laid off, they
settle for lower wages in other sectors, such as construction, causing lower wages in those
sectors from the increased competition among workers.”).  And manufacturing imports from
less-developed countries have grown from .9% of gross domestic product in 1973 to 6.3% in
2011. Id.
162 In 2011, for example, the average hourly compensation cost was $21.42 in Israel,
$11.65 in Brazil, $8.83 in Poland, $6.48 in Mexico, and $2.01 in the Philippines. See News
Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, International Comparisons of Hourly Compensation Costs
in Manufacturing, 2011 (Dec. 19, 2012); see also Penn, supra note 161 (noting that the grow- R
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to relocate work because of low-wage options overseas or domesti-
cally.163  And for unorganized workers, companies are free to cut pay
and benefits unilaterally based on market realities.
Even if a company is profitable or competitive, it still is efficient to
look at the market rate of labor based on local labor competition, labor
costs in other states, and labor costs in other countries.  Market rates
anywhere now influence what companies are willing to pay their work-
ers.  Even companies that control their product market or dominate their
competitors are demanding decreases in pay and benefits as the starting
point of contract renewal negotiations.  The following example illustrates
this practice.
1. The DPS Example
In May 2008, Cadbury Schweppes Americas Beverages spun off its
beverage operations from its confectionary business to create the Dr Pep-
per Snapple Group (“DPS”), an independent publicly traded company.164
DPS went public as a leader in the beverage business, with highly recog-
nized brands and significant market share.165  The company is an indus-
try leader in the carbonated and non-carbonated beverage business,
occupying the number one or number two spot for most of its brands.166
Net income was $503 million in 2009 and $595 million in 2010.167
In February of 2010, the company began negotiations for a new
collective bargaining contract covering employees at their Williamson,
New York, facility that produces Mott’s apple juice.168  The company
proposed a reduction in wages of $1.50 per hour, arguing that the em-
ployees’ pay scale was not competitive with that of hourly production,
ing trade with low wage countries accounted for about $1,800 of lost wages for a full-time
worker without a college degree in 2011).
163 See Larry Swisher, Right-to-Work Laws Lower Nonunion Wages Along with Union
Membership, Studies Find, 27 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 441 (Mar. 6, 2013).  In states with strong
opposition to unions, compensation costs are often lower because, with little worker support,
the union threat is small. See Henry S. Farber, Nonunion Wage Rates and the Threat of Union-
ization, 58 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 335, 338–39 (2005) (acknowledging that unions find it
more difficult to organize workers and maintain their status as bargaining representatives in
states that prohibit employee financial support of unions as a condition of employment).
164 See Dr Pepper Snapple Grp., Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement for Annual Meeting of
Stockholders (Form DEF 14A), at 23 (May 19, 2009) [hereinafter DPS May 19, 2009 Proxy
Statement].
165 Id.
166 See id. (noting that 75% of their business comes from brands that are number one or
two in the categories in which they compete).
167 See Dr Pepper Snapple Grp., Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement for Annual Meeting of
Stockholders (Form DEF 14A), at 23 (May 20, 2010) (detailing 2009 results); Dr Pepper
Snapple Grp., Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement for Annual Meeting of Stockholders (Form
DEF 14A), at 28 (May 19, 2011) (detailing 2010 results).
168 See Ari Paul, Rotten Apples, Core Values, NATION, Aug. 12, 2010, at 28–30.
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transportation and material moving workers in the area.169  The company
argued that Mott’s employees averaged $21 per hour, while comparable
workers in the area received $14 per hour.170  In addition to wage cuts,
the company also proposed freezing pensions, ending pensions for new
employees, reducing 401(k) retirement contributions, and increasing em-
ployee health care contributions to bring benefits in line with what was
paid at other DPS plants.171
The union rejected the pay and benefits reduction, noting that the
wage cut amounted to about $3,000 per year per employee and that a
reduction in pension and health benefits could have devastating effects
on workers’ economic security.172  Further, the union contested the em-
ployer’s claim that employees averaged $21 per hour, arguing that 70
percent of workers made $19 per hour or less.173  The union also claimed
that food manufacturing workers in the area averaged $25 per hour.174
When the contract expired in April 2010 without an agreement, the union
went on strike.175  The strike was settled after sixteen weeks with the
union agreeing to a wage freeze, no pension for new hires, and reduced
employer contribution to 401(k) plans.176
This concession bargaining strategy at the Mott’s plant reflects a
common practice in contract renewal negotiations.  DPS did not argue
that it was losing market share or profitability because of anti-competi-
tive labor costs.  Nor did the company argue that its competitors were
paying less, thereby reducing its competitiveness.  Rather, the company
relied on its assessment that food manufacturing workers were readily
available at $14 per hour, so paying more than that would be ineffi-
cient.177  The company also believed that the lowest benefit level it pro-
vided at any of its plants should be the benchmark for other plants.178
The bargaining strategy and proposals advanced by DPS are all per-
fectly legal.  Nothing in the NLRA prevents an employer from taking
advantage of abundant labor supply or labor sold at prices lower than
those provided in an expired bargaining contract.  In fact, managerial and
stockholder primacy demand that companies seize cost-cutting opportu-
nities.  DPS made this clear by stating that it has “a fiduciary responsibil-
169 See id.
170 See Steven Greenhouse, In Mott’s Strike, More Than Pay at Stake, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
18, 2010, at B1 [hereinafter Greenhouse, Mott’s Strike].
171 See id.
172 Id.; see also Paul, supra note 168 (reporting a worker’s claim that “reduced medical R
benefits would have made it impossible for him to make ends meet.”).
173 See Greenhouse, Mott’s Strike, supra note 170. R
174 See Paul, supra note 168. R
175 Id.
176 See Greenhouse, Mott’s Strike, supra note 170. R
177 See id.
178 Id.
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ity to operate in the best interests of all its constituents, recognizing that a
profitable business attracts investment, generates jobs, and builds com-
munities.”179  One plant manager reportedly stated that labor was no dif-
ferent than commodities like oil and soybeans subject to fluctuating
prices.180  With no legal restraint on “efficiency bargaining,” DPS repre-
sentatives deployed it with some success against the union.  And the
company’s proxy statements show how senior management and stock-
holders benefitted from the tough stance with the union.
Labor cost is an obvious target for concession bargaining because it
usually represents the single biggest cost in a firm’s operating budget.181
For a publicly traded company like DPS, top executives are incentivized
to cut labor and other costs because rewards for cost-cutting may be built
into their compensation structure.  In the case of DPS, executive com-
pensation generally emphasizes rewards for results that advance stock-
holders’ and senior executives’ interests.182  By aligning company
leaders’ compensation to profitability and stock performance, employee
pay and benefits become inevitable targets.
By all accounts, DPS is a successful company.  During the year of
the labor dispute, the company reported net income of $595 million.183
Its stock price, which ranged between $13.45 and $17.39 in December
2008, had risen to between $35.12 and $38.04 in December 2010.184
Since 2010, the stock price has gone up consistently, dividends have
been paid every year since 2009, and profits have been consistently high
despite an overall poor economy.185
179 See Greenhouse, Mott’s Strike, supra note 170. R
180 See id.
181 See News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employer Costs for Employee Com-
pensation—December 2012 (Mar. 12, 2013) (stating that wages and salaries accounted for
70.3% of employee compensation costs in 2012); Terry Thomason, Changes Coming in Davis-
Bacon Act Wage Rate Procedures, 4 PAC. EMP. L. LETTER 4 (2000) (noting that labor is
usually the single largest cost in the public contracting process).
182 For example, the DPS proxy statement filed in 2009 reported a heavy emphasis on
stock awards in its compensation scheme, noting: “The Compensation Committee believes that
these awards to our key executives will focus attention on building stockholder value over the
long-term, reinforce the importance of their roles as stewards of the business, and help to
retain the executives.”  DPS May 19, 2009 Proxy Statement, supra note 164, at 27.  This R
approach to compensation is typical, and CEOs of American companies have repeatedly
warned that advancing stockholders’ interests is their only responsibility. See Celeste Drake,
U.S. Trade and Economic Policy: American Workers Need More than Strong Labor Chapters,
27 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 455, 465–67 (2012).
183 Dr Pepper Snapple Grp., Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement for Annual Meeting of
Stockholders (Form DEF 14A), at 29 (Mar. 25, 2011) [hereinafter DPS Mar. 25, 2011 Proxy
Statement].
184 See Dr Pepper Snapple Group, Inc Common Stock Historical Stock Prices, NASDAQ,
http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/dps/historical (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
185 See id.
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The DPS executives targeted the Mott’s employees’ pay and bene-
fits structure for concessions because this would increase not only profit-
ability and shareholder value, but also their personal compensation.186
Evidence that the company ratified the concession bargaining strategy
can be found in the proxy statement filed in March 2011.187  The strike at
the Mott’s plant had caused a $12 million decline in profits in the pack-
aged beverage segment of the company, and this loss reduced executive
compensation by 8 percent.188  For fiscal year 2010, the compensation
committee removed the losses associated with the strike from the finan-
cial and operating metrics in order to boost executive pay by 8
percent.189
In effect, the DPS executives succeeded in gaining concessions
from their workers and profited personally, although there was an operat-
ing loss.  Corporate flexibility to excise labor contracting losses from
management performance metrics incentivizes demands on workers’ pay
by executives who are well compensated.  For example, for the years
2008 to 2010, total compensation for DPS’s President and CEO averaged
$7,276,088 per year;190 the President of packaged beverages averaged
$2,117,734 per year;191 the President of concentrates averaged
$2,076,527 per year;192 and the Executive Vice President of supply chain
averaged $1,883,521 per year.193  DPS replaced its Chief Financial Of-
ficer in 2010, and his replacement’s 2010 compensation was
$6,099,378.194
Because worker pay and benefits represent the predominant operat-
ing cost and there are no legal restraints on employers’ bargaining liber-
ties, unions are seeing more of what transpired in the Mott’s
186 See DPS Mar. 25, 2011 Proxy Statement, supra note 183, at 29. R
187 See id.
188 See id.
189 See id. (“[T]he Compensation Committee has discretion under the [Management In-
centive Plan] to adjust [earnings] results if there is an unanticipated business condition that
materially affected the fairness of the goals and unduly influenced the company’s ability to
meet those goals.  For fiscal year 2010, the Compensation Committee considered the strategic
nature of this strike and concluded that event was an unanticipated business condition that
materially affected the fairness of the goals and unduly influenced the company’s ability to
meet these goals.  Consequently, the Compensation Committee excluded those costs when
considering the achievement of the goals. As a result of that exclusion, the performance
against the financial and operating metrics improved and the payments to be made under the
MIP for fiscal year 2010 were increased by approximately 8%.”).
190 See id. at 35.  Additional financial perks include over $140,000 for the CEO and
CFO’s private club activities, plus $150,000 to cover the CEO’s tax bill for private use of the
corporate jet. See Dr Pepper Snapple Grp., Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement for Annual Meet-
ing of Stockholders (Form DEF 14A), at 25 (Mar. 30, 2010).
191 See DPS Mar. 25, 2011 Proxy Statement, supra note 183, at 35. R
192 See id.
193 See id.
194 Id.
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negotiations.  With senior management’s and stockholders’ interests in
competition with those of workers, labor’s claim that better compensa-
tion strengthens the economy and promotes democracy is having little
impact on management practices.  Workers therefore need to formulate
and implement other strategies to secure a larger share of their produc-
tive efforts.
IV. NEW STRATEGIES TO COMPRESS WAGES IN LIGHT OF POLITICAL
GRIDLOCK
Unions recognize that existing labor regulations place significant
limits on their ability to raise wages.  Under the NLRA, unions have
found it difficult to grow membership to broaden the reach of their col-
lective bargaining efforts and improve their strike clout.195  Union occu-
pational strongholds have eroded, more jobs are being outsourced,
technological developments have eliminated jobs in which workers tradi-
tionally organized, employee sentiments are in flux, and the legions of
low-wage service workers are proving to be very difficult to organize.
These realities leave unions with fewer workers to organize or represent
in a climate of fierce wage competition and employer opposition.196
A. The Problem of Declining Union Strength
In the private sector, unions have the greatest support in four indus-
tries: construction and extraction; installation, maintenance and repair;
production; and transportation and material moving.197  These industries
have representation rates of 20.3%, 17.6%, 14.6%, and 17.8% respec-
195 The electoral process for determining the workers’ representative has been condemned
for giving employers too much time and opportunity to intimidate and mislead workers. See
Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and
Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 371–72 (2002); see also Ken Matheny, Catholic
Social Teaching on Labor and Capital: Some Implications for Labor Law, 24 ST. JOHN’S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 1, 5 (2009) (“[T]he Act’s reliance on elections to determine union represen-
tation facilitates employer opposition . . . .”); GETMAN, supra note 72, at 179–90, 275–87
(arguing that the NLRB’s processes are complex, and proposing amendments to the NLRA to
make union selection more effective).  But some relief may be in sight with more expedited
representation procedures adopted by the NLRB. See generally Associated Builders & Con-
tractors of Tex., Inc. v. NLRB, No. 1-15-CV-026 RP, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78890 (W.D.
Tex. June 1, 2015) (rejecting the contention that the NLRB’s new expedited representation
rules deprive employers of a fair hearing on critical election issues and an adequate opportu-
nity to campaign).
196 See Opfer, supra note 5 (reporting significant Republican support for national legisla- R
tion that would prevent unions from requiring financial support from the workers they re-
present); see also Michael Bologna, Supporters See 2015 As ‘Tipping Point’ Year for States
Passing Right-to-Work Legislation, 29 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 119 (Jan. 21, 2015) (reporting
that twenty-four states have such laws and several others are poised to follow).
197 See News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members—2013, at tbl.1 (Jan.
24, 2015).
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tively, but these percentages reflect continuing declines.198  From 2003
to 2013 the representation rate in the construction industry declined from
22.7% to 20.3% percent, the installation industry dropped from 20% to
17.6%, production representation fell from 18.5% to 14.6%, and trans-
portation saw a decline from 21.3% to 17.8%.199  Even for job categories
that can be labelled union strongholds, the raw number of workers being
represented is declining.  Unions have not been able to stop this slide for
over thirty years,200 and nothing suggests the downward trajectory will
change.
On the question of wages, only two of four union stronghold occu-
pational categories report median hourly wages above the national me-
dian.  The  May 2014 median for construction  was $19.90 per hour,
while the installation, production, and transportation industries showed
medians of $20.25, $15.25, and $14.20 per hour, respectively.201  While
many of the jobs in these four industries pay above the median, most of
the jobs in some industries are decidedly low-wage.202  For example, in
construction, most non-supervisory jobs pay above the $17.09 per hour
national median with the poverty-level wages reserved for helpers.203
But in production, very few jobs pay anything close to the national me-
dian hourly rate.204  Transportation also has many non-supervisory occu-
pations that pay above the national median, but these jobs require
extensive education or training or both, as do most of the higher paying
jobs in any industry.205  Pilots, flight engineers, locomotive engineers,
ship or boat captains, and crane operators are examples of jobs that pay
well above the median in the transportation category.206
B. Other Barriers to a Collective Bargaining Strategy
As unions try to compress wages, a number of practical and philo-
sophical barriers also stand in their way.  First, any attempt to get above-
198 See News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members in 2003, at tbl.3 (Jan.
21, 2004).
199 See id.
200 See Dale Belman & Paula B. Voos, Union Wages and Union Decline: Evidence from
the Construction Industry, 60 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 67, 67 (2006) (noting that private
sector union membership peaked in the 1950s at around 35% but has fallen gradually and
consistently since then).
201 See News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Employment and
Wages—May 2014, at tbl.1 (Mar. 25, 2015).
202 See id.  Helpers, assembly line workers, and food processors generally make less. Id.
203 See id. at tbl.1.  Plumbers, carpenters, masons, electricians, and machine operators are
examples of workers earning above the median. Id.
204 See id.  Food processors, equipment assemblers, and machine tool setters generally
earn below the median. Id.
205 Id.
206 See id.
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market wage premiums is vigorously opposed.207  Union wage premi-
ums—which are credited with building the middle class—have also been
blamed for making businesses uncompetitive, destroying jobs, and reduc-
ing union membership.208  Unions are constantly battling the claim that
higher wages mean higher prices, fewer jobs, and a general attack on the
efficiency imperatives of management.209  Further, technological devel-
opments and innovations have eliminated many more jobs than they have
created,210 and the replacement jobs do not generally pay median
wages.211  During the 2008 economic crisis, 7.5 million mid-wage jobs
were lost212 but only 70,000 mid-wage jobs were regained when the re-
cession ended.213  This means that there are fewer median wage workers
for unions to represent for the purpose of wage acquisition, wage reten-
tion, or wage improvement.
Global wage competition has also incentivized the outsourcing of
millions of jobs that are not likely to return, thereby further reducing the
pool of mid-wage workers that could be represented.214  In any event,
businesses have argued that job losses to foreign locales are not simply a
product of a low-wage philosophy.  In the manufacturing sector, for ex-
ample, it has been argued that plant closings are primarily “attributable to
increased foreign outsourcing of purchases of intermediate goods and
services.”215  And multinationals have contended that they have global-
ized around markets or consumers, not simply in pursuit of low wages.216
207 See Michael Rose, Witnesses Again Spar Over Minimum Wage, with Focus on CBO
Report Showing Job Loss, 28 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 569 (Mar. 1, 2014) (reporting Republican
opposition to a minimum wage increase, premised on its potential to reduce employment).
Business groups and sympathetic legislators oppose initiatives that seek to increase union clout
or worker pay. See Lawrence E. Dube´, Business Groups Push Back on NLRB Rules with Bid
for Delay, Request for Information, 52 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) A-10 (Mar. 18, 2014) (reporting
on strong business interest in NLRB’s plan to make representation proceedings more
efficient).
208 See Belman & Voos, supra note 200, at 67–68; Barry T. Hirsch & Edward J. Schu- R
macher, Private Sector Union Density and the Wage Premium: Past, Present, and Future?, 22
J. Lab. Res. 487, 490–500 (2001).
209 See Rhonda Smith, Low-Wage Workers’ Push for Higher Pay Could Have Negative
Effects, Opponents Say, 169 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) C-1 (Aug. 30, 2013).
210 See Condon & Wiseman, supra note 33; Chris Arnold, How Technology Is Eliminat- R
ing Higher-Skill Jobs, NPR (Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/11/03/141949820/how-
technology-is-eliminating-higher-skill-jobs.
211 See Arnold, supra note 210. R
212 See Condon & Wiseman, supra note 33. R
213 Id.
214 See, e.g., Charles B. Craver, The Labor Movement Needs a Twenty-First Century
Committee for Industrial Organization, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 69, 83–84 (2005) (not-
ing that large corporations establish labor-intensive factories in low-wage nations to maximize
benefits to shareholders).
215 See Ben Penn, ‘Runaway’ Plants Not to Blame for Closings of Manufacturing Plants,
According to Study, 27 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 306 (Feb. 13, 2013).
216 See Wessel, supra note 36. R
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This, it is argued, accounts for job losses in the United States and job
growth at their foreign operations.217  To the extent that businesses do
more hiring abroad for strategic reasons, unions lose opportunities to
grow membership.
Further, unions have lost significant ground with mid-wage workers
in occupations that were once regarded as traditional union strongholds.
Unions no longer have the ability to secure above-median wages for
workers with only a high school education, as they did in the auto and
steel industries.218  These employers are now paying less or are non-
union.219  In the auto industry, for example, unions have been forced to
make wage concessions and agree to two-tiered wage structures that limit
the mid-wage prospects of some members.220  And mid-wage workers at
foreign-owned auto plants are not choosing unions even when there is no
opposition to the union by the employer.221  This is partly due to the fact
that some workers share the sentiment that unions are responsible for the
economic problems of American auto manufacturers.222  This pattern is
being repeated in many occupations that unions historically
dominated.223
The potential of unions to compress wages is further stunted by po-
litical opposition to improving the wages of the working poor.  So far
unions have not succeeded, for example, in organizing the millions of
low-wage workers in retail sales, and food preparation jobs.224  And any
attempt to provide ladders to median-wage pay for these workers will
face crushing opposition by businesses and policymakers.225  Businesses
217 Id.; see also Larry Swisher, U.S. Multinational Firms Boosted Jobs More Overseas
than at Home in 2012, 28 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 1865 (Sept. 3, 2014).
218 See Michael Selmi, Unions, Education, and the Future of Low-Wage Workers, 1 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 147, 147–48 (2009).
219 See id. at 162; see also Michael Bologna, Steelworkers Accept Pact Freezing Wages
for Six-Year Period and Suspending Pension, 27 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 1144 (June 19, 2013)
(reporting on concession pressures the United Steelworkers union faced in recent contract ne-
gotiations with Caterpillar Incorporated, resulting in a wage freeze, a two-tiered wage struc-
ture, and the suspension of a defined-benefit pension plan).
220 See Bill Vlasic, Detroit Sets Its Future on a Foundation of Two-Tier Wages, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A1.
221 See Steven Greenhouse, VW Vote Is Defeat for Labor in South, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,
2014, at B1 [hereinafter Greenhouse, VW Vote] (reporting on a union election loss at a Volk-
swagen assembly plant even though management remained neutral and even voiced some sup-
port for the union); see also Selmi, supra note 218, at 162 (noting that unions have not been R
able to organize foreign auto manufacturers in the United States although they pay competitive
market rates).
222 See Greenhouse, VW Vote, supra note 221, at B1. R
223 See Selmi, supra note 218, at 162; Lawrence Mishel, Unions, Inequality, and Falter- R
ing Middle-Class Wages 9 (Econ. Pol’y Inst., Issue Brief No. 342, 2012).
224 See Selmi, supra note 218, at 160–61 (discussing the practical impediments to or- R
ganizing low-wage workers).
225 See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text.
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argue that unions are failing because workers are being compensated
well and are not interested in unions.226  And the prevalence of wage
theft or the failure to comply with minimum wage and overtime compen-
sation laws suggests that employers want even more pay flexibility with
low-wage workers.227
Legislative opposition to gradually increasing the minimum wage to
$10.10 per hour—despite popular and some business support for this in-
crease228—also provides strong evidence that most businesses will op-
pose wage demands that are significantly above market rates or
minimum wage laws.229  In any event, even if low-wage workers could
be organized, it is improbable that union premiums could elevate their
226 See Michael Rose, Unions’ Decline Caused by Lack of Interest on Part of Workers,
Chamber Official Says, 27 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 1681 (Sept. 4, 2013).  And non-union work-
ers have made wage gains on unionized workers.  In the third quarter of 2012, average non-
union hourly pay rose 2.5% to $20.04 per hour, while union worker pay rose by 1.1% to
$23.51 per hour. See Nonunion Workers See Sharper Wage Gain, Pay and Benefits Still Lag
Behind Unionized, 26 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 2320 (Dec. 19, 2012).
227 See John Herzfeld, New York Recovered Nearly $23 Million from Wage Cases in
2013, Governor Says, 29 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-9 (Feb. 12, 2014) (reporting 6,533 new
claims for wage theft in 2013); see also Lawrence E. Dube´, Labor Solicitor Sees Low-Wage
Epidemic and Urges Employers to Take ‘High Road,’ 27 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 1115 (June 12,
2013) (reporting that “minimum wage violations, unpaid hours, and off-the clock work” all
contribute to a low wage epidemic).
228 See Ben Penn, Demonstrators Nationwide, Lawmakers Push for Wage Increase; Poll
Shows Public Agrees, 142 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-5 (July 24, 2013) (reporting that 80% of
Americans support a minimum wage hike from $7.25 to $10.10 per hour); Chris Opfer, Busi-
ness Leaders Stump for Wage Hike, Says It’s Good for Economy, Won’t Kill Jobs, 29 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-12 (Feb. 12, 2014) (reporting that business leaders told Congress that a
minimum wage hike would help tens of millions of workers, expand the economy, and benefit
taxpayers without hurting job growth or consumers); Michael Rose, Two-Thirds of Small Busi-
ness Owners Favor Increasing Minimum Wage, According to Poll, 79 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
A-6 (Apr. 24, 2013) (reporting that 67% of polled small business owners support increasing
the minimum wage).  Some businesses are not waiting for Congress to act and have already
increased their starting wages. See Chris Opfer, Gap Inc. to Raise Workers’ Minimum Wage,
Aligning It with Pay of Few National Retailers, 34 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-10 (Feb. 20,
2014); Ben Penn, Obama Says Congress Must Catch Up to Rest of Nation by Raising Mini-
mum Wage, 28 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 248 (Feb. 5, 2014) (“[F]acing an uncertain path in
Congress, Obama called on business leaders to follow Costco’s lead by lifting workers’ pay
voluntarily.”).
229 See, e.g., Danny Westneat, A Do-Gooder Tells Why $15 Wage Is a Bad Idea, SEATTLE
TIMES (Feb. 22, 2014), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/a-do-gooder-tells-why-15-
wage-is-bad-idea; Dominic Holden, Up for Debate in the $15 Minimum Wage Conversation,
STRANGER (Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.thestranger.com/seattle/up-for-debate-in-the-15-mini
mum-wage-conversation/Content?oid=19053597.  Off-the-clock and uncompensated overtime
practices also suggest that employers want more productivity for current pay rates. See Lisa
Nagele, State High Court Affirms $187 Million Award on Wal-Mart Employees’ Wage & Hour
Claims, 241 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-2 (Dec. 16, 2014) (reporting workers’ court victory on
being denied rest breaks and required to work off-the-clock); Gayle Cinquegrani, LinkedIn to
Pay $5.8 Million in Overtime Damages to 359 Employees in Four States, 28 Lab. Rel. Wk.
(BNA) 1683 (Aug. 6, 2014) (reporting record-keeping violations that robbed employees of
pay).
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pay to the $15 per hour level that food preparation and other low-wage
workers are demanding.230  Because these practical limitations have
combined with free market collective bargaining to limit wage growth
for many workers, new strategies are necessary to improve wages.
C. Pay Disparity Worker Protest
The inability of regulators and unions to provide workers with wage
stability has left them with few options.  Regulations intended to curb
excessive senior managers’ pay have not targeted workers as their in-
tended beneficiaries.231  Instead, their focus has been on preventing
shareholder losses and assuring that pay is linked to performance.232
Even the latest regulatory device that requires disclosure of the ratio of
the CEO’s pay to the median compensation of all other employees is not
designed to promote workers’ interests,233 and businesses have computa-
tional flexibility that can reduce the ratio.234  But workers do not have to
230 The union wage premium for represented workers has been estimated at around
13.6%.  Lawrence Mishel, Unions, Inequality, and Faltering Middle-Class Wages, ECON.
POL’Y INST. 1 (Aug. 29, 2012), http://www.epi.org/files/2012/ib342-unions-inequality-middle-
class-wages.pdf.  And the size of the wage premium varies by occupation and demographics.
Id. at 4; see also George I. Long, Differences Between Union and Nonunion Compensation,
2001–2011, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 16, 18 (Apr. 2013), http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2013/04/
art2full.pdf.  Median pay for food preparation workers is  about $9.20 per hour and the median
for retail sales workers is about $9.66 per hour. See News Release, supra note 201, at tbl.1. R
231 See Brett H. McDonnell, Two Goals for Executive Compensation Reform, 52 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 585, 586–87 (2008) (describing reform proposals’ emphasis on protecting share-
holders’ interest over economic inequality or other fairness concerns).
232 See Priyanka Rajagopalan, Reforming Executive Compensation: What Do We Know
and Where Do We Go?, J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 425, 441–42 (2011) (discussing the
shareholder goals of tax and other corporate regulations of executive pay); Paul Hodgson,
Surprise Surprise: Say on Pay Appears to be Working, FORTUNE (July 8, 2015), http://fortune.
com/2015/07/08/say-on-pay-ceos (reporting that a comparison of total shareholder return to
increases in CEO pay suggests that regulations giving shareholders a say on executive pay may
be working).
233 See Joe Pinsker, When Workers Know Exactly How Much More Money CEOs Make,
Will Anything Change?, ATLANTIC (Aug. 6, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/
archive/2015/08/will-the-pay-gap-between-ceos-and-workers-ever-get-smaller/400601/ (re-
porting that new CEO pay ratio disclosure rules will likely generate more headlines and bene-
fits for media outlets than for shareholders, workers or consumers). But see Drew Harwell &
Jenna McGregor, This New Rule Could Reveal the Huge Gap Between CEO Pay and Worker
Pay, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/
2015/08/04/this-new-rule-could-reveal-the-huge-gap-between-ceo-pay-and-worker-pay/ (com-
menting that new CEO pay disclosure rules could become “a human resources nightmare,
exposing the raw and awkward tensions of workplaces undercut by growing pay gaps”).
234 The rule leaves the methodology for identifying the median employee to the company
based on their particular circumstances, and permits the use of a statistical sampling of the
total employee population. See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rule for
Pay Ratio Disclosure (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-160.html;
see also Kevin McCoy, SEC Approves ‘Pay Ratio’ Disclosure for CEOs, USA TODAY (Aug.
7, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2015/08/05/sec-pay-ratio-disclosure-vote/
31112725/ (observing that the disclosure requirement gives companies “substantial flexibility”).
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wait until the 2017 or 2018 compliance dates to find out how much the
CEO of their company makes relative to the larger workforce.235  The
media and other organizations already publicize this information to
workers.236  Workers would be more alarmed to find out what top man-
agers are compensated in relation to their own wages, and that informa-
tion is already publicly available.237  Data showing that extreme wage
disparity is caused primarily by the growth of senior managers’ pay pro-
vides workers with an opportunity to claim a larger share of their produc-
tive efforts.238
Comprehensive data show that the United States is the most inegal-
itarian society with respect to the distribution of income from labor.239
Today wage disparity in the United States is so extreme it has reverted to
1910–1920 levels240 and rivals the extreme disparities seen in Europe
over 100 years ago.241  Now, the top 10% of earners claim 35% of the
nation’s total labor income while the bottom 50% gets only 25%.242  Top
managers represent 60% to 70% of the top 0.1% of the income ranks243
and their phenomenal growth in pay has been approved by their Boards
of Directors and stockholders.244  Should current pay practices continue,
235 See McCoy, supra note 234 (reporting the earliest compliance date for some compa- R
nies as January 2017 and for others, the following year).
236 See Pinsker, supra note 233 (“In an annual rite, newspapers compile lists of the previ- R
ous year’s highest-earning executives, think tanks compute just how much more CEOs make
than the average worker, and then both sides of the debate use those standalone figures to
serve their purposes.”); Lawrence Mishel & Alyssa Davis, Top CEOs Make 300 Times More
Than Typical Workers, ECON. POL’Y INST. 1(June 21, 2015), http://www.epi.org/files/2015/
top-ceos-make-300-times-more-than-typical-workers.pdf (reporting that over the past 30 years,
CEO pay has outpaced wage growth for all other workers); Kathryn Dill, Report: CEOs Earn
331 Times As Much As Average Workers, 774 Times As Much As Minimum Wage Earners,
FORBES (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kathryndill/2014/04/15/report-ceos-earn-
331-times-as-much-as-average-workers-774-times-as-much-as-minimum-wage-earners/ (re-
porting union-computed CEO compensation ratios).
237 See McCoy, supra note 230 (“Publicly traded U.S. firms already disclose compensa-
tion of their CEOs and other top executives in proxy filings submitted to the SEC before
annual stockholder meetings.”).
238 See PIKETTY, supra note 2, at 298–99; see also Smith, supra note 3 (reporting em- R
ployee complaints to shareholders that Walmart’s CEO received compensation in fiscal year
2015 that was 811 times greater than the average hourly pay of store employees); Michael
Rose, CEO Made 373 Times What Average Worker Did in 2014, Annual AFL-CIO Analysis
Finds, 29 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 1055 (May 13, 2015) (reporting average CEO pay at $13.5
million per year while the average for production and non-supervisory employees was $36,134
during 2014).  One CEO made $156 million in 2014, and Walmart’s CEO was paid $9,323 per
hour while the store’s retail workers starting pay was $9 per hour. See id.
239 See PIKETTY, supra note 2, at 256. R
240 See id. at 321.
241 See id. at 292–93.
242 See id. at 256.
243 See id. at 302.
244 See id. at 332; see also Nelson D. Schwartz, Bank of America Investors Complain, but
Approve Chief’s Pay, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/busi
ness/bank-of-america-shareholders-protest-but-approve-pay.html?_r=0 (reporting shareholder
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the share held by the bottom 50% could drop to less than 18% by
2030.245  By contrast, in the most egalitarian countries, the top 10% of
earners claim only 20% of total labor income.246
Worker protest highlighting wage disparities has demonstrated its
potential to improve wages.  Unorganized workers have been protesting
low pay by pointing to pay disparities, calling for a starting wage of $15
per hour.247  Walmart has responded by announcing that it will raise em-
ployees’ wages, which the company said would cost $1.5 billion and a
drop in profits.248  Outside of the collective bargaining process, Walmart
has spent $1 billion in raises in 2015 and will spend more on salary
increases through 2016.249  McDonald’s workers fighting for a $15
hourly wage have also garnered some success by targeting shareholders.
Repeated protests likely influenced McDonald’s decision to raise wages
by $1 at ten percent of company stores, despite overall declining sales
and profits.250
Senior managers’ pay continues to grow in spite of regulatory at-
tempts to curb it.251  Workers can emphasize the unfairness of large sala-
ries unhinged from performance because productive performance has not
produced wage gains at the lower end of the pay scale.252  Although
approval for a $7 million pay package for the CEO despite his poor management of the
company).
245 See PIKETTY, supra note 2, at 256. R
246 See id. at 246, 253–55; see also Alistair Bruce et al., Top Executive Remuneration: A
View from Europe, 42 J. MGMT. STUD. 1493, 1498 (2005) (noting that European CEO to
hourly worker pay ratios are dramatically lower than in the United States).
247 See Robert B. Reich, Organizing McDonalds and Walmart, and Why Austerity Eco-
nomics Hurts Low-Wage Workers the Most, ROBERT REICH (Nov. 30, 2012), http://rober-
treich.org/post/36892075499 (discussing the protest activities of low wage workers and their
link to large executive pay packages).
248 See Shannon Pettypiece & Rhonda Smith, Wal-Mart Plans to Give Raises to 1.1 Mil-
lion U.S. Workers, 12 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) (Jan. 20, 2016) (reporting the view that worker
protest and public pressure forced Walmart to increase the pay of low-wage workers).
249 See id.
250 See Wisniewski, supra note 37. R
251 Despite large existing compensation disparities, executive pay continues to outpace
that of low-wage workers. See Mary Hughes, CEOs at Smaller Companies Saw Pay Grow,
Stock Awards Gain Ground, Survey Finds, 144 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-5 (July 26, 2013)
(reporting pay increases of 5.7% and 6.5% for heads of mid-sized and large companies respec-
tively in 2012).  These increases translated into median annual pay of $4.7 and $9.7 million
respectively. Id.  Meanwhile the compensation increases for union represented workers aver-
aged 4.4% from 2010 to 2011, while nonunion workers saw an increase of only .8%. See
Growth in Union Workers’ Pay in 2012 Outpaced that of Nonunion Workers, 27 Lab. Rel. Wk.
(BNA) 542 (Mar. 20, 2013).
252 At the outset, measuring executive performance is a difficult if not impossible pro-
position. See PIKETTY, supra note 2, at 330–32 (observing that particularly in the case of senior R
managers, individual marginal productivity is hard to define or measure, so pay is arbitrarily
determined by the relationships and bargaining strengths of the individuals involved); STIG-
LITZ, supra note 15, at 42, 78–79 (stating that incentive pay is just a label to justify abusive R
pay practices that are not tied to performance).  And there is evidence that compensation com-
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CEOs in particular have been lionized by some as star athletes whose
great talents are in limited supply, thereby driving their prices sky
high,253 there is evidence that these positions are not receiving market
compensation rates.254  The astronomical payouts that some CEOs re-
ceive at retirement also provide a basis for complaints because of the
payouts’ redistributive potential.255  While critics have specifically
targeted CEO pay because of its extreme disparity to the earnings of
average workers,256 the broader problem is with large compensation
packages for top executives or senior managers.  As a group, these em-
ployees take home an outsized share of their companies’ output, and
there is no evidence that top executives or senior managers are in short
supply or that their skills are primarily responsible for their companies’
success.257  In fact, the 2008 recession revealed many instances where
performance was poor and destructive to both the company and the econ-
omy, yet rewards to top managers remained high.258  Payouts to Bear
Stearns and Lehman Brothers executives prior to their firms’ collapse
provide a rich example of astronomical pay for poor performance.259  In
mittees lack the tools that are needed to measure performance. See Paul Vigna, What’s a CEO
Really Worth? Too Many Companies Simply Don’t Know, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 21, 2014), http://
blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/11/21/whats-a-ceo-really-worth-too-many-companies-simply-
dont-know/.
253 See ROBERT B. REICH, SUPERCAPITALISM 108 (2007) [hereinafter REICH,
SUPERCAPITALISM] .
254 See Bivens & Mishel, supra note 2, at 63 (“[T]he rise in income for the top 1 percent R
was not necessary to entice the people in that group to seek those jobs nor to provide effort in
those jobs.”); see also Katie Johnston, Efforts to Regulate CEO Pay Gain Traction, BOS.
GLOBE (Oct. 26, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/10/25/growing-effort-
limit-ceo-pay/1VKKZCuZMkXJvaQRmUb4RN/story.html (reporting on research which
shows that money is not a work motivator for people who are well compensated).
255 See REICH, SUPERCAPITALISM, supra note 253, at 111 (justifying a $398 million retire- R
ment package for one CEO based on the ten-year success of the company’s stock under his
leadership); see also Robert B. Reich, CEOs Deserve Their Pay, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 14, 2007),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB118972669806427090 [hereinafter Reich, CEOs Deserve
Their Pay] (arguing that an almost $400 million retirement package to one CEO is justifiable
on stock performance grounds); Jesse Drucker et al., Retirement Savings of Top 100 CEOs
Approaches $5B, 208 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-6 (Oct. 28, 2015) (“The retirement savings
accumulated by just 100 chief executives are equal to the entire retirement accounts of 41
percent of U.S. families or more than 116 million people.”).
256 See Reich, CEOs Deserve Their Pay, supra note 255 (noting that forty years ago, R
CEOs earned twenty to thirty times the average worker, while today they receive 364 times
average worker pay).
257 See Susan Adams, The Highest-Paid CEOs Are the Worst Performers, New Study
Says, FORBES (June 6, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/2014/06/16/the-highest
-paid-ceos-are-the-worst-performers-new-study-says/ (reporting research that shows that the
highest paid executives perform the worst).
258 See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear
Stearns and Lehman, 2000–2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 259 (2010).
259 See id. (“[T]he top executive teams of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers derived cash
flows of about $1.4 billion and $1 billion, respectively from cash bonuses and equity sales
during 2000–2008.”); see also Halah Touryalai, Citi’s Pandit Sued Over Excessive Compensa-
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addition, the desire for high pay is so arbitrary that failed senior manag-
ers at several banks could cite talent as a justification for pocketing $32.6
billion in bonuses while accepting $175 billion in bailout funds.260
D. Combining Workers’ Protest Gains with Union Representation
Workers, with the support of unions, can hammer away at the pay
disparity issue to coerce their companies into restructuring pay practices.
Pay increases gained through protest can be consolidated through union
affiliation.  With increased membership rolls, unions will have more bar-
gaining power to cement the gains secured through protest.261  With
union representation, continuing protests that target lavish pay schemes
can force corporate boards to be responsive to workers while simultane-
ously reducing the risk of compromised performance metrics and self-
serving evaluations of performance to justify high pay.262  More attention
to this issue will assure shareholders that compensation metrics align
with positive company performance.263  It may also force senior manag-
tion, FORBES (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2012/04/20/citis-
pandit-sued-for-excessive-compensation/ (reporting shareholder lawsuit challenging high ex-
ecutive pay awards despite the bank’s dismal performance).
260 See Karen Freifeld, Banks Paid $32.6 Billion in Bonuses Amid U.S. Bailout, BLOOM-
BERG (July 30, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news%3Fpid%3Demail_en%26sid%3
DaHURVoSUqpho.  At six of the nine banks involved, bonuses exceeded profits.  See Susanne
Craig & Deborah Solomon, Bank Bonus Tab: $33 Billion, WALL ST. J. (July 31, 2009), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB124896891815094085.
261 Without contractual commitments, employees remain vulnerable to employers’ discre-
tion with respect to any benefits granted. See NLRB v. Exch. Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409
(1964) (discussing the conditional nature of benefits voluntarily conferred by an employer to
unorganized workers).  Employers may also seek to cut benefits in some areas after granting
benefits in others. See Shannon Pettypiece, Wal-Mart Cuts Some Workers’ Hours After Pay
Raise Boosts Costs, 168 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-5 (Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.bloom
berg.com/news/articles/2015-08-31/wal-mart-cuts-some-workers-hours-after-pay-raise-boosts-
costs (reporting Walmart’s decision to cut employees’ work time after giving them a pay
raise).
262 For example, at Verizon Communications, top managers’ compensation is tied to per-
formance at the fiftieth percentile of peer companies.  See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., Definitive
Proxy Statement for Annual Meeting of Stockholders (Form DEF 14A), at 31–32, 41 (May 5,
2011).  This means that senior managers can be rewarded well for average or poor company
performance and receive astronomical payouts if the company does well. See id.
263 See id. at 41.  As one Verizon shareholder noted, based on the existing performance
metrics, Verizon’s performance would have to rank below the twentieth percentile of peers for
executives to get no equity rewards, while performance at the twenty-sixth percentile level gets
executives 50% of targeted awards, and performance at the eighty-eighth percentile level or
better results in a 200% award for the CEO, valued at $22 million. Id.; see also Schwartz,
supra note 244 (reporting that shareholders voted against the proposed compensation plan for R
top executives at Citigroup); Mike Esterl & Joann S. Lublin, Coke Scales Back Executive
Equity Compensation, Bowing to Pressure, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/coca-cola-tweaks-executive-compensation-plan-1412170448.  Although investor con-
cerns about excessive pay are generally tied to poor or declining company performance, rather
than its redistributional potential, their success at checking this practice reveals an opportunity
for unions.  See Gregory J. Millman, Say-on-Pay Performance Spurs Engagement, WALL ST.
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ers to look for non-wage cost-cutting strategies such as restructuring lib-
eral return policies in the retail sales market that cost companies billions
of dollars every year.264
Beyond securing and locking in wage increases, unions need a bar-
gaining strategy to share in business success.  The rationale for high
managerial pay is its link to performance and corporate success.265  This
rationale should be equally applicable to low-wage workers.  When com-
panies encounter business downturns, average workers are expected and
required to make concessions that will ensure the company’s survival
and success.266  Reciprocally, employers should be willing to share busi-
ness success with all workers.  During contract negotiations, unions can
propose a yearly bonus pay provision tied to company performance, or a
profit-sharing plan that provides employer contributions to a savings ac-
count.  Such a one-time payment has the advantage of not placing an
economic burden on the company during periods of austerity.267  This
strategy provides a viable option to compress wages in a competitive
economic climate.
J. (Jan. 15, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2015/01/15/the-morning-risk-re-
port-poor-say-on-pay-performance-spurs-engagement/ (reporting that companies are more en-
gaged and transparent when they do poorly on say-on-pay votes).
264 See Cotten Timberlake, Don’t Even Think About Returning that Dress, BLOOMBERG
(Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-09-26/return-fraud-clothing-
and-electronics-retailers-fight-back (discussing the steps some companies have taken to com-
bat return-fraud); see also Jennifer C. Kerr, Retailers Tracking What Customers Return, USA
TODAY (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/08/12/retailers-
tracking-customers-returns/2642607/ (reporting on the use of a return tracking service to com-
bat fraud and customers’ privacy concerns).  Manufacturers are also heavily impacted by lib-
eral return policies and the fraud associated with it. See William Sherrard et al.,
Manufacturers’ Dilemma: Managing a Growing Volume of Returned Merchandise, MFG. &
TECH. NEWS, http://www.manufacturingnews.com/news/editorials/sherrard.html.
265 See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 766 (2002).
266 See Mike Colias et al., Is High-Paying Tier 1 At Risk in UAW Talks?, AUTOMOTIVE
NEWS (Mar. 22, 2015), http://www.autonews.com/article/20150322/OEM/303239958/is-high-
paying-tier-1-at-risk-in-uaw-talks? (reporting that top-paid Detroit auto workers have not re-
ceived a wage increase in ten years, and newer workers doing the same job (Tier 2) are being
paid about half the wages of long-term employees as part of the carmakers’ recovery plan); see
also Tom Walsh, UAW Talks to be Tough, but No Need for Drama, DETROIT FREE PRESS
(Mar. 21, 2015), http://www.freep.com/story/money/business/columnists/tom-walsh/2015/03/
21/uaw-bargaining-drama/25081063/ (discussing concerns about changing autoworkers’ wage
structure in upcoming contract negotiations).
267 See Michael Wayland, Toyota’s Per-Car Profits Lap Detroit’s Big 3 Automakers, DE-
TROIT NEWS (Feb. 22, 2015), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/business/autos/2015/02/22/
toyota-per-car-profits-beat-ford-gm-chrysler/23852189/ (reporting on the competitive disad-
vantage of American car manufacturers attributable to higher wage and pension costs);
Eduardo Porter, Japanese Cars, American Retirees, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2006), http://
www.nytimes.com/2006/05/19/automobiles/19auto.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (reporting on
the competitive burdens of high costs of retiree benefits of American car manufacturers in
relation to their Japanese counterparts).
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Although profit sharing is not a new idea, it has taken on renewed
importance in an economy characterized by large wage disparities.  One
presidential candidate is proposing tax credits for employers that share
their profits with average workers,268 and some businesses have ex-
pressed their preference for profit sharing over fixed wage increases.269
Worker advocates note that even President George Washington sup-
ported profit sharing and point to its economic benefits for businesses,
workers and the economy.270  At the same time, some well-known com-
panies have demonstrated that sharing a portion of their profits with
workers does not destroy their competitive advantage.271  Southwest Air-
lines’ record-breaking 2014 payout of $355 million, which translated into
a 9.6% bonus per eligible employee, provides a good example of a more
egalitarian pay structure.272
Workers cannot wait for “show the ratio” regulations to kick in be-
cause it tells them too little about actual pay disparities in the company to
have any real impact on their attitude about pay.273  A comparison of
each worker’s pay to that of each top manager will be far more alarming
and likely to trigger a more aggressive response.274  Large wage dispari-
268 See Martin Sullivan, Can Hillary’s Plan for Profit Sharing Lift the Economy?, FORBES
(July 20, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2015/07/20/can-hillarys-plan-for-
profit-sharing-lift-the-economy/ (describing presidential candidate Hillary Clinton’s proposal
for a profit sharing tax credit and how economists view such proposals).
269 See Wayland, supra note 267 (noting that Detroit automakers favor profit-sharing). R
270 See Joseph Blasi & Richard Freeman, Southwest Airlines’ Profit-Sharing Payout:
What Capitalism Should Be, FORTUNE (Apr. 17, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/04/17/south-
west-airlines-profit-sharing-payout-what-capitalism-should-be/ (reporting on President George
Washington’s support for tax credit legislation intended to revitalize the codfish industry that
was destroyed by the British).
271 See Southwest Airlines’ 41st-Consecutive Profit Sharing Payment is Record Dollar
Amount—$355 Million, SOUTHWEST AIRLINES (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.prnewswire.com/
news-releases/southwest-airlines-41st-consecutive-profitsharing-payment-is-record-dollar-
amount—355-million-300031213.html (reporting that Southwest has been able to grow its
business, improve customer service, and increase profits while increasing the economic re-
wards it provides to its workers) [hereinafter Southwest Airlines]; see also Employees Earn
More Than $1 Billion in Profit Sharing for 2014 Performance, DELTA AIRLINES (Feb. 13,
2015), http://news.delta.com/employees-earn-more-1-billion-profit-sharing-2014-performance
(reporting Delta Airlines’ profit sharing payout to workers based on the company’s record-
breaking financial success); Terry Maxon, American Airlines Employees to Split $85 Million
in Profit-Sharing; US Airways Employees to Divvy Up $124 Million, DALLAS MORNING NEWS
(Feb. 26, 2014), http://aviationblog.dallasnews.com/2014/02/american-airlines-employees-to-
split-85-million-in-profit-sharing-us-airways-employees-to-divvy-up-124-million.html/ (re-
porting other airlines’ profit sharing announcements); Chris Isidore, Ford Workers to Get Re-
cord $8,800 Profit Share Checks, CNN MONEY (Jan. 28, 2014), http://money.cnn.com/2014/
01/28/news/companies/ford-profit/ (reporting Ford’s profit sharing payout based on record
company profits).
272 Southwest Airlines, supra note 271. R
273 See Pinsker, supra note 233. R
274 For example, a comparison that shows Walmart’s CEO making $9,323 per hour—
compared to a retail worker’s $9 per hour—may promote more worker discontent and protest.
See Rose, supra note 238. R
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ties can buttress union proposals for profit sharing because top execu-
tives also profit from such success.  This approach is more likely to be
embraced by corporate managers because it eliminates the long-term
risks associated with contractual wages, benefits, and retirement plans.275
CONCLUSION
The national decision to regulate the sale of labor on the same free
market terms as goods and services always held the potential to under-
mine collective bargaining as a source of wage growth for the larger
workforce.  In a fully integrated global economy, labor costs must be
competitive across the globe.276  But labor costs differ dramatically
around the country and the world.277  Further, right-to-work laws ap-
proved by the NLRA, and free trade policies not contemplated by the
NLRA, encourage businesses to shift capital and operate in localities
with the lowest labor costs.278
Employers can comply with their wage-bargaining obligations
under the NLRA while refusing union demands at the bargaining table.
Now that global wage competition has devalued labor, employers’ de-
mand for wage flexibility is much more legitimate and defensible.279  It
is now more compelling when company officials say they are at a com-
petitive disadvantage simply because labor is available at a cheaper rate
somewhere else in the national or international market.  As a result, un-
ions have few options when companies demand significant wage and
benefits concessions from their workers, despite posting huge profits.280
Labor supporters continue to focus on reforming the NLRA by pro-
posing stronger penalties for violations and by expanding the base of
workers who could be organized.281  But more modest proposals have
275 See Colias et al., supra note 266 (reporting that the CEO of Fiat Chrysler Automobiles R
is amenable to pay increases for lower paid workers based on a profit metric); Wayland, supra
note 267 (reporting that a profit sharing wage system has given General Motors more financial R
flexibility than a fixed pay-raise system).
276 See STIGLITZ, supra note 15, at 63. R
277 See News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, International Comparisons of Hourly
Compensation Costs in Manufacturing, 2011 (Dec. 19, 2012).
278 See generally Craver, supra note 50; see also Lucy B. Bednarek, The Gender Wage R
Gap: Searching for Equality in a Global Economy, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 213,
215–16 (1998) (noting that with globalization and increased economic competition among
nations, companies search for the most profitable opportunities around the globe).
279 See Susan R. Hobbs, Moderation Likely to Prevail in Active Year of 2012 Collective
Bargaining, 15 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) S-47 (Jan. 24, 2012) (discussing the limited success
unions are likely to have at the bargaining table in the face of foreign competition, continuing
high levels of unemployment, and a weak economy).
280 See Greenhouse, Mott’s Strike, supra note 170; see also Steven Greenhouse, Citing R
Stalemate, Verizon Workers Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2011, at A8.
281 See Michael Rose, Trumka: First Labor Law Overhaul Bill to Deal with Remedies,
169 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-10 (Sept. 9, 2015) (reporting one labor leader’s efforts with
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failed in the past, and the current political climate is not sympathetic to
the economic claims of workers even as productivity, profits, and wage
inequality have increased.282  With globalization, the egalitarian claims
of labor have become harder to make.  Business leaders argue that they
have a fiduciary obligation to move capital and jobs to locales that give
them the greatest business advantage.283  As such, they have a fundamen-
tal right to utilize any venue or strategy that increases profits, irrespective
of the effects on workers.284
Corporate regulations to rein in excessive pay have also failed to
incorporate the interests of the larger workforce so median and low-wage
workers have been left in the competitive labor marketplace.285  But
worker protest outside of the collective bargaining process has shown
some promise to improve wages.  However, without contractual commit-
ments, any pay increase voluntarily given can be retracted in the future
or minimized by reduction in other job benefits.  Unions can support pay
disparity protests and play a role in guaranteeing wage gains from
worker protests using their collective bargaining skills.  Unions should
also revive profit sharing as a core bargaining strategy because profit
sharing is more palatable to employers than fixed wage and benefit plans
that magnify long-term financial commitments.
legislators to introduce a bill that would provide for treble damages in cases where workers are
unlawfully terminated for union activities).
282 See Chris Opfer, Congress Returns for Showdown on Labor Initiatives, 172 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) CC-1 (Sept. 4, 2015) (reporting the agenda of Republicans to challenge recent
decisions or regulations of the NLRB and the Department of Labor that are viewed as anti-
employer).
283 See, e.g., Joe Weisenthal, Ballmer Threatens Obama, Says He’ll Move Jobs Overseas,
BUS. INSIDER (June 3, 2009), http://www.businessinsider.com/ballmer-threatens-obama-says-
hell-move-jobs-overseas-2009-6.
284 See Larry Swisher, U.S. Multinational Firms Added More Jobs at Foreign Affiliates
Than at Home in 2011, 228 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-9 (Nov. 25, 2013) (reporting a 4.2%
boost of employment abroad versus a 4% increase at home).
285 See Wages Fell More for Lower-Wage Workers Than High Earners in 2009–2012,
Study Says, 131 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-9 (July 9, 2013) (reporting that from 2009–2012,
median and low-wage workers saw drops in wages as high as 4.1%, although worker produc-
tivity has increased).
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